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INTRODUCTION
Modern public law is strongly devoted to the notion that
public officials should be held “accountable” for their decisions.1
This is not surprising because the legitimacy of governmental
authority in a democracy is often thought to depend upon the
consent of the governed.2 Although a very general form of democratic consent and political accountability is arguably achieved
by holding periodic elections whereby a majority of voters select
candidates to represent them for a fixed term in office, modern
public law theory and doctrine have increasingly demanded
more from these concepts.3 Specifically, voters must be able to
hold public officials accountable for their specific policy choices
to ensure that those decisions are consistent with the preferences of a majority. Moreover, in what might be considered optimistically circular reasoning, modern public law typically presumes that elected officials are politically accountable for their
specific policy decisions because they are selected and potentially removed from office by the voters.
This Article draws on recent interdisciplinary scholarship
from law and political science, which demonstrates that the latter empirical presumption is simply not the case.4 Public officials are not held politically accountable for their specific policy
decisions pursuant to periodic elections, and there are overwhelming reasons to believe that this will never be the case.
Moreover, in the absence of a reliable enforcement mechanism,
modern public law’s efforts to legitimize government authority
by connecting specific policy decisions to the will of the majority
are bound to be misplaced.

1. See Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the AntiAdministrative Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2073 (2005) (recognizing that
“[t]he idea of accountability is very much in fashion in legal and political
thought these days,” and that “the term is used in a variety of different ways”).
2. See Sherman J. Clark, A Populist Critique of Direct Democracy, 112
HARV. L. REV. 434, 442 (1998) (explaining that under theories of popular sovereignty, “a regime is legitimate if people are made to follow only those rules to
which they have consented”).
3. See infra notes 16–40 and accompanying text.
4. See infra Parts II, IV.A. For leading interdisciplinary sources on this
point, see Jane S. Schacter, Political Accountability, Proxy Accountability, and
the Democratic Legitimacy of Legislatures, in THE LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH
45, 47 (Richard W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana eds., 2006); and Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A New Perspective on
the Central Obsession of Constitutional Theory, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1287, 1304–29
(2004).
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The Article turns to deliberative democratic theory to identify an alternative means of legitimizing governmental authority and holding public officials accountable for their decisions.5
Specifically, it contends that individual policy choices are democratically legitimate to the extent that they are supported by
public-regarding explanations that could reasonably be accepted by free and equal citizens with fundamentally different
interests and perspectives. Accordingly, public officials can be
held deliberatively accountable by a requirement or expectation
that they give reasoned explanations for their decisions that
meet those criteria.
Legal scholarship on the concept of democratic accountability is surprisingly undeveloped in light of the importance of this
topic for modern public law theory and doctrine.6 Moreover, the
best scholarship in this area tends simply to challenge existing
assumptions or focus solely on questions of democratic theory.7
This Article builds upon the existing work in a concrete and
comprehensive way by connecting legal theory and doctrine, political science, and democratic theory on the concept of democratic accountability to question the prevailing status quo and
propose an alternative way of thinking about the matter. Specifically, it (1) explains that modern public law theory and doctrine are currently dominated by a particular paradigm of political accountability; (2) demonstrates that the prevailing
paradigm is empirically implausible; and (3) sets forth an alternative paradigm of deliberative accountability that is both
more realistic and normatively attractive. Finally, the Article
claims that the deliberative accountability paradigm should be
made paramount and discusses the implications of doing so for
public law theory and doctrine. These implications range from
the elimination of the countermajoritarian difficulty, to the rejection of unitary executive theory and unduly formal methods
of statutory interpretation, to a refined conception of judicial
review of agency action, and to deep concerns about the legitimacy of the ballot initiative process. The Article closes by providing a tangible example of the implications of a paradigm
shift in our understanding of democratic accountability for in5. See infra Part III.
6. See Jane S. Schacter, Ely and the Idea of Democracy, 57 STAN. L. REV.
737, 755 (2004) (“Accountability . . . has gotten a fairly easy pass in the legal
scholarship on democracy and constitutionalism.”).
7. For outstanding contributions in each of these genres, see, respectively, Schacter, supra note 4, at 45–47, and AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON,
DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (1996).
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dividual rights that focuses on the controversy over same-sex
marriage. The example illustrates that some legal or policy outcomes would change if there was an obligation to justify them
on the merits, rather than by resorting to the alleged need to
defer to officials who are “politically accountable,” which it
turns out, upon examination, is typically false.
I. THE DOMINANCE OF THE POLITICAL
ACCOUNTABILITY PARADIGM
One can hardly read a judicial opinion in a controversial
case or a law review article on a public law topic these days
without encountering some rhetoric about the need for, or value
of, democratic accountability. In judicial opinions, the standard
technique is for decision-makers who uphold governmental action to justify their conclusions at least in part on the basis of
the need to defer to choices made by democratically accountable
officials.8 This technique is invariably accompanied by a critique of any opposing judges for seeking to impose their personal
preferences on the electorate, despite the democratically unaccountable status of the federal judiciary.9 Similarly, it has become a truism in contemporary legal scholarship that policy decisions should be made by democratically accountable
officials.10 Any scholar who advocates a meaningful role for un8. See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 388 (1996) (“[J]udges occupy a
unique and limited role, one that does not allow them to substitute their views
for those in the executive and legislative branches . . . who have the constitutional authority and institutional expertise to make these uniquely nonjudicial
decisions and who are ultimately accountable for these decisions.”).
9. See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120,
190–91 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (claiming that the FDA’s statutory authority to regulate tobacco should have been upheld, partly because the responsible administrative officials and their elected supporters would be held
politically accountable for a policy decision of this magnitude); Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 652–63 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s decision to invalidate a policy choice by “the people of Colorado” on the
grounds that “it [is] no business of the courts (as opposed to the political
branches) to take sides in [a] cultural war” and claiming that the decision was
“an act, not of judicial judgment, but of political will”).
10. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and
Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 480 (2003)
(“Post-Bickel, scholars began to distrust not only judicial use of individual
rights to invalidate popularly enacted statutes, but any policy decision made
by unelected officials.”); Jonathan T. Molot, Ambivalence About Formalism, 93
VA. L. REV. 1, 2 (2007) (identifying efforts to “minimize judicial intrusions into
the political process” in different fields of modern public law in response to the
core problem of justifying judicial authority in “a post-realist age . . . when
judging is understood to be an active, creative enterprise”).
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elected officials in making discretionary policy choices is therefore automatically on the defensive, because it is widely believed that such a position demands heightened justification.
Although the meaning of “democratic accountability” is
deeply contested and increasingly debated in the social
sciences,11 legal scholars have devoted surprisingly little attention to the issue.12 The vast majority of legal commentators
have simply equated democratic accountability with political
accountability and presumed that policy-making authority is
most legitimately exercised by elected representatives of the
people.13 This Part describes the existing political accountability paradigm, explains how it is currently dominating every domain of contemporary public law, and describes the prevailing
hierarchy of perceived institutional competence that has
emerged.
It is important to recognize at the outset that the idea of
political accountability could be understood to operate at two
very different levels of abstraction. On a general level, political
accountability simply means that the electorate has an opportunity to select a representative and decide whether to retain
that person in office at the end of a specified term. General political accountability of this nature exists, by definition, whenever public officials must stand for election. Elections, moreover, are an essential element of democracy because they
provide a means for achieving a peaceful and orderly succession
from one governing regime to another,14 in addition to allowing
voters to protect themselves from abuses of power by their own
representative government and ensuring that the existing leadership can plausibly claim to have the consent of the governed.15 The general political accountability that is provided
11. See, e.g., DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND REPRESENTATION (Adam
Przeworski et al. eds., 1999); PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY (Michael W. Dowdle
ed., 2006). The latter volume includes some contributions by legal scholars.
12. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
13. See Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution,
98 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 532 (1998) (“The vast majority of theorists have failed
to challenge [Alexander] Bickel’s basic assumption, that political accountability is the sine qua non of legitimacy in government action.”); infra notes 20–23
and accompanying text.
14. See Rubin, supra note 1, at 2077 (“One of the most important functions that elections do serve is to solve the problem of succession.”).
15. See Brown, supra note 13, at 565 (“Elections provide the people with
an opportunity to punish [representatives] who have violated their duty by invading the liberties of the people.”). For a comprehensive development of this
point, see id. at 565–71.
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by elections is therefore undeniably central to democracy, but it
does not tell us very much about the requisite link between the
policy preferences of the voters and the specific policy choices of
their elected representatives, or the extent to which specific
policy decisions could legitimately be made by unelected public
officials.
The prevailing paradigm of modern public law has moved
beyond a concern with general political accountability and focuses instead on a perceived need to ensure that public officials
are politically accountable to a majority of the electorate for
their specific policy decisions. This extension of the requisite
scope of political accountability is almost certainly a reflection
of several related developments in legal and political theory.16
First, legal realism demonstrated that most legal rules are the
result of choices by authoritative decision-makers rather than
objectively ascertainable truths.17 Shortly thereafter, pluralism
emerged as the leading theory of American democracy, whereby
the political process was conceived as a marketplace in which
selfish private interests compete for resources.18 These intellectual movements combined to generate a newfound commitment
to the principle of majority rule: if there is no objectively ascertainable “public good,” and participants in the political process
are merely seeking to satisfy their own subjective preferences,
then the only legitimate way to make policy decisions that are
binding on everyone is to follow the wishes of a majority of the
citizens.19 Governmental officials can therefore only legitimately make public policy decisions on behalf of the electorate if
they implement the majority’s preferences. Because public officials would otherwise have overwhelming incentives to stray
16. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term—Foreword:
The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 66–68 (1989) (describing
these developments).
17. For an iconic decision that signified acceptance of this view by the Supreme Court, see Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
18. See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 145–
48 (1956) (discussing the role of special interest groups in the making of government decisions).
19. See Chemerinsky, supra note 16, at 68 (“If courts cannot discern true
values, because none exist, and if majoritarian decisionmaking is the ideal,
judicial review is nothing but the substitution by unelected judges of their
values for those of popularly elected legislatures.”); see also Brown, supra note
13, at 538–39 (documenting the historical development and recent dominance
of “the majoritarian paradigm” in constitutional theory and explaining that for
its adherents, “democratic government means that decisions affecting the polity will be made by accountable officials; anything else runs counter to the very
defining principles of this nation”).
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from this obligation, voters must be able to hold them accountable for their specific policy choices.
Not only has modern public law extended its focus to a perceived need for specific political accountability, but contemporary public law theory and doctrine typically presume that
elected officials are politically accountable for their specific policy decisions because they are selected and potentially removed
from office by the voters. For example, Alexander Bickel famously claimed that judicial review is “a deviant institution” in
American democracy because it allows unelected judges to invalidate the decisions of a popularly elected legislature.20 The
countermajoritarian difficulty, which has been the central obsession in constitutional theory for decades, is premised on a
belief that elected officials are politically accountable for their
decisions, while members of the federal judiciary are not.21 Because discretionary policy decisions in a democracy should be
made by representatives who are accountable to the electorate,
the judiciary’s invalidation of congressional legislation (or executive action) on constitutional grounds appears antidemocratic. Although constitutional scholars have devised
countless theories that seek to explain why meaningful judicial
review does not necessarily conflict with democracy,22 few
commentators have even examined—much less challenged—
the underlying assumption that elected officials are politically
accountable for their decisions and that their policy choices are
rendered legitimate on this basis.23
20. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16–23
(Yale Univ. Press 2d ed. 1986) (1962).
21. See Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV.
577, 630 (1993) [hereinafter Friedman, Dialogue] (“The countermajoritarian
difficulty posits that the ‘political’ branches are ‘legitimate’ because they further majority will, while courts are illegitimate because they impede it.”); Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 155 (2002)
[hereinafter Friedman, Academic Obsession] (“For decades, legal academics
have struggled with the ‘countermajoritarian difficulty’: the problem of justifying the exercise of judicial review by unelected and ostensibly unaccountable
judges in what we otherwise deem to be a political democracy.”); Jane S.
Schacter, Lawrence v. Texas and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Democratic Aspirations, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 733, 762 (2004) (“The idea that
legislators are accountable and courts are not lies at the very heart of the
countermajoritarian difficulty.”).
22. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
23. See Schacter, supra note 21, at 762 (“Despite the axiomatic character
that Bickel and others seem to give this notion of accountability, constitutional
scholars have barely scratched the surface in examining the quality and quan-
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Moreover, the assumption that elected officials are politically accountable for their decisions has been extended to other
areas of modern public law theory with similar ramifications.
Thus, the prevailing theory of legitimacy in administrative law
is the “presidential control model,” which “seeks to ensure that
administrative policy decisions reflect the preferences of the
one person who speaks for the entire nation.”24 Because the
President is the only nationally elected official in the American
system of government, his decisions will presumably reflect the
preferences of a majority of the electorate.25 If the President
nonetheless strays from the will of the people, he (or at least
his political party) can be held accountable at the next election.26 Accordingly, the legislature’s delegation of policy-making
authority to administrative agencies, which would otherwise be
difficult to square with the American constitutional structure,
can be legitimized if agency decisions are subject to the control
of the Chief Executive who is politically accountable to all of
the nation’s voters.
The political accountability of the President has also provided a leading rationale for the judiciary’s deference to reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions by
administrative agencies. In Chevron, the Supreme Court explained that both agencies and courts are obligated to follow
legislative intent when they implement a statute if Congress
has expressly resolved the precise question at issue during the
lawmaking process.27 If, however, Congress did not directly adtity of political accountability that actually exists.”); supra note 13 and accompanying text.
24. Bressman, supra note 10, at 490.
25. See Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary
Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23, 58–70 (1995) (arguing for “[a] unitary, nationally representative executive”); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114
HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2331–39 (2001) (describing how “presidential administration promotes accountability”); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 91–106 (1994) (discussing
the historical development of “presidential authority” with respect to administration agencies); Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators
Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 95 (1985) (“[I]t may
make sense to imagine the delegation of political authority to administrators
as a device for improving the responsiveness of government to the desires of
the electorate.”). But see Jide Nzelibe, The Fable of the Nationalist President
and the Parochial Congress, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1217 (2006) (challenging the
claims and implications of this literature).
26. See Bressman, supra note 10, at 491.
27. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842–43 (1984).
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dress the precise question at issue, the judiciary should defer to
a reasonable interpretation by the agency that was delegated
authority to implement the program, rather than imposing its
own construction on the statute.28 While the Court relied upon
the presumptive intent of Congress and the expertise of agencies, it also emphasized the superior political accountability of
the President who exercises predominant control over the administrative state:
Judges are not experts in the field, and . . . must, in some cases, reconcile competing political interests, but not on the basis of the
judges’ personal policy preferences. In contrast, an agency to which
Congress has delegated policymaking responsibilities may, within the
limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent administration’s views of wise policy to inform its judgments. While agencies
are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is. . . .
[F ]ederal judges—who have no constituency—have a duty to respect
legitimate policy choices made by those who do. The responsibilities
for assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the
struggle between competing views of the public interest are not judicial ones: “Our Constitution vests such responsibilities in the political
branches.”29

The judiciary’s role in statutory interpretation is also
strongly influenced by the assumption that elected officials are
politically accountable for their decisions when Chevron deference is unavailable. The principle of legislative supremacy,
whereby the judiciary is obligated to follow clearly expressed
statutory mandates, is almost universally accepted in the
American legal system.30 One reason for the principle’s popularity stems from its compatibility with conventional understandings of the legislative and judicial functions, which involve the enactment of generally applicable policies that are
interpreted and applied in concrete cases or controversies.31
The principle also draws much of its force, however, from the
related notion that these institutional roles are mandated by a
28. See id. at 843–44.
29. Id. at 865–66.
30. See Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 594 (1995) (“Our
legal culture’s understanding of the link between statutory interpretation and
democratic theory verges on the canonical and is embodied in the principle of
‘legislative supremacy.’”); see also Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation
and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281, 282 (1989) (defending a “weak”
version of legislative supremacy that “precludes judicial policymaking only
when a statutory directive is clear”(footnote omitted)).
31. See Farber, supra note 30, at 292–93 (“Because the supremacy principal is fundamental to our institutional framework, violations of the principal
defeat justified expectations and impair legal stability.”).
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commitment to democracy because legislators—unlike judges—
are politically accountable to their constituents.32
Contemporary public law scholars have generally concluded that the principle of legislative supremacy should be
understood to require courts to serve as the “faithful agents” of
Congress.33 Moreover, the new textualists have claimed that a
faithful agent of Congress is obligated to adhere to the plain
meaning of statutory text based on the lessons of public choice
theory and a proper understanding of the American constitutional structure.34 The most devout proponents of this methodology have even concluded that it is illegitimate for the federal
judiciary to deviate from a clear statutory text to exercise
equitable discretion or to avoid absurd results in particular
cases.35 Among the purported goals of both the underlying methodology and its more extreme implications are to limit the
policy-making discretion of the unaccountable judiciary and
enhance the political accountability of the legislature when it
exercises policy-making authority.36 As is true of the other leading theories, the new textualism treats political accountability

32. See Schacter, supra note 30, at 594 (“Fidelity to the legislature is
thought to satisfy the demands of democratic theory by allowing popularly
elected officials, presumed to be accountable to their constituents, to make policy decisions.”).
33. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court 1983—Foreword:
The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 60 (1984) (“Judges
must be honest agents of the political branches. They carry out decisions they
do not make.”); John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV.
2387, 2389 (2003) (“In a system marked by legislative supremacy (within constitutional boundaries), federal courts act as faithful agents of Congress.”).
34. See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 15–22 (2001).
35. See Manning, supra note 33, at 2387–91; John C. Nagle, Textualism’s
Exceptions, ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, 2002, at 1, 2, http://www.bepress
.com/ils/iss3/art15/ (“[W]hen the statutory text admits of no ambiguity, then
the results of that interpretation—absurd or otherwise—become irrelevant to
the textualist.”).
36. See Elizabeth Garrett, Legal Scholarship in the Age of Legislation, 34
TULSA L.J. 679, 685 (1999) (“[M]ethods like textualism . . . are best understood
as efforts to improve the quality of the decisionmaking in the politically accountable branches.”); Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 23–29 (2006) (describing textualism’s efforts in “cabining judicial leeway”); Schacter, supra note 30, at 642 (explaining that Justice
Scalia’s approach to statutory interpretation reflects “his persistent suspicion
that legislators are chronically tempted to pass off difficult choices of policy to
others and that such behavior sabotages the project of electoral accountability”).
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as the sine qua non of legitimate policy-making discretion in a
democracy.37
The dominance of the political accountability paradigm in
contemporary public law theory has (perhaps ironically) contributed to successful efforts to undermine representative democracy in recent years. If voters must be able to choose and control their elected officials and some degree of “agency slack” is
endemic to this relationship, democratic accountability would
only be strengthened by allowing voters to make policy decisions directly. Thus, the use of the ballot initiative process,
which is routinely characterized as “lawmaking by the people,”
has skyrocketed in recent years at the state and local levels
partly as a result of widespread frustration with the traditional
legislative process.38 Given the prevailing understanding of
democratic accountability, it is not surprising that this form of
lawmaking is frequently praised “as democracy in its purest
form, as the closest we can come to genuine popular sovereignty.”39 Indeed, if direct democracy is lawmaking by the people,
successful ballot measures would arguably embody the consent
of the governed and thereby achieve democratic legitimacy
without the need for “accountability” that arises from the delegation of lawmaking authority to an agent of the people.40
An examination of the dominant schools of thought in the
fields of constitutional theory, administrative law, and legislation reveals the establishment of a broader hierarchy of per37. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Judicial Discretion in Statutory Interpretation, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 9–10 (2004) (claiming that “tenure” provides “a powerful reason not to allow judges to make policy” in a representative democracy because “[w]hen judges make policy—which is, after all, what discretion in
interpretation means—you can’t get rid of them”).
38. See Glen Staszewski, Rejecting the Myth of Popular Sovereignty and
Applying an Agency Model to Direct Democracy, 56 VAND. L. REV. 395, 412–20
(2003) (describing the typical perception of direct democracy and its increased
use in recent years).
39. Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of “Popular Intent”: Interpretive Dilemmas in Direct Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107, 151 (1995) (citing In re Estate of
Thompson, 692 P.2d 807, 808 (Wash. 1984)). Although direct democracy has
been criticized for other reasons, the ballot initiative process is typically considered above reproach on grounds of democratic accountability. See Bernard W.
Bell, Marbury v. Madison and the Madisonian Vision, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
197, 233 (2003) (“The apotheosis of accountability is the plebiscite, and other
forms of direct democracy.”).
40. See Christopher J. Peters, Assessing the New Judicial Minimalism,
100 COLUM. L. REV. 1454, 1477 (2000) (“Accountability, of course, would not be
an issue in a direct democracy, in which every citizen participated directly in
making laws.”).
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ceived institutional competence that corresponds with the perceived political accountability of its actors. Thus, lawmaking by
the people through the ballot initiative process is the “ideal”
form of decision making in a democracy.41 Because this process
is not always practical or available, public officials will still
need to make countless important decisions.42 A broad consensus has recently emerged that those decisions should preferably
be made by a chief executive who is politically accountable to
all of the nation’s voters.43 Although the executive branch may
not contravene a constitutionally valid legislative mandate,
statutes typically cannot be enacted without the executive’s assent, and substantial enforcement discretion is preserved after
a bill becomes a law.44 Moreover, there is widespread debate
about the scope of the constitutional limits on Congress’s authority to direct or constrain the activities of the executive
branch and whether the President has independent authority
to implement his understanding of the Constitution outside the
courts.45 The dialogue on these subjects suggests that many, if
not most, public law scholars would place the Chief Executive
41. See Clark, supra note 2, at 437 (“The populist case for direct democracy is straightforward and appealing: direct democratic processes are at some
level more democratic, more legitimate, than representative institutions, because they are more directly responsive to the people.”); Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1513 (1990) (recognizing
that if “[m]ajoritarian democracy . . . is the core of our constitutional system
. . . the plebiscite certainly seems to have a strong claim to being its most treasured instrument”).
42. Most significantly, the American Constitution prohibits direct democracy at the federal level. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
43. See Cynthia Farina, The Consent of the Governed: Against Simple
Rules for a Complex World, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 987, 987–88 (1997) (recognizing that courts and commentators have increasingly looked to the President
“to supply the elusive essence of democratic legitimation” in the modern regulatory state because “[t]he President, and the President alone, represents the
entire citizenry” and is therefore uniquely situated “to infuse into regulatory
policymaking the will of the whole people”); supra notes 24–29 and accompanying text (describing the perceived political accountability of the President).
44. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7; Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 831 (1985)
(holding that non-enforcement decisions are presumptively immune from judicial review under the APA).
45. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial
Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1360–62 (1997) (describing the arguments in support of executive non-deference to Supreme
Court constitutional interpretation, but arguing for the primacy of judicial interpretation); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive
Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 343–45 (1994) (concluding
that the President should have the power to review the decisions of the judicial and legislative branches).
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one position above the legislature in this particular hierarchy.
Administrative agencies, which were traditionally viewed as
constitutionally suspect, have been legitimized (and, in effect,
promoted to a position just below that of the legislature) in contemporary public law theory by the political accountability of
the President who controls the modern administrative state.46
In any event, the independent judiciary plainly sits at the bottom of this institutional hierarchy and, indeed, modern public
law can be understood as nothing more or less than an effort to
ensure that the judiciary is appropriately deferential to these
other politically accountable decision-makers.
II. THE IMPLAUSIBILITY OF THE POLITICAL
ACCOUNTABILITY PARADIGM
Modern public law typically presumes that elected officials
are politically accountable to the voters for their specific policy
decisions. President Bush and the Environmental Protection
Agency would therefore presumably be accountable for the
agency’s decision to transfer its permitting power to officials
from Arizona under the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System without determining whether this course of action
would jeopardize a protected species under the Endangered
Species Act.47 Similarly, federal lawmakers would presumably
be accountable for their decision to prohibit the knowing performance of the intact dilation and evacuation procedure for
terminating a pregnancy regardless of whether a medical professional determined that this procedure was necessary for the
preservation of the mother’s health.48 Federal lawmakers
would also presumably be responsible for their apparent decision to require the Secretary of Education to calculate the per
pupil expenditures of local school districts in a particular fa46. See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text (discussing Chevron);
see also FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 161 (2000)
(“[N]o matter how ‘important, conspicuous, and controversial’ the issue, and
regardless of how likely the public is to hold the Executive Branch politically
accountable, an administrative agency’s power to regulate in the public interest must always be grounded in a valid grant of authority from Congress.”(citation omitted)).
47. See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct.
2518, 2521–22 (2007) (5–4 decision) (reversing the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion
that the transfer of power was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the
APA).
48. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1632 (2007) (5–4 decision)
(rejecting a facial challenge to the constitutional validity of the Partial Birth
Abortion Act of 2003).
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shion under the Impact Aid Program.49 Judicial decisions to invalidate these actions or to deviate from the plain meaning of
the governing legal texts would therefore illegitimately substitute the court’s policy preferences for the apparent will of the
people.
For this form of political accountability to work, however, it
would be necessary for the electorate (1) to know about the government’s decision; (2) to have an established preference about
its desirability; (3) to be capable of identifying who was responsible for the decision; and (4) to vote on the basis of this information at the next election. One need not be a rocket scientist—or even a political scientist—to realize that this set of
conditions will only be satisfied in the most extraordinary of
circumstances.50 In short, the presumption that elected officials
are politically accountable for their specific policy decisions is
wildly unrealistic. This ideal is therefore typically either a formality or a fiction, but it is not meaningful enough, in reality,
to carry the massive weight that is placed upon it by modern
public law theory. This Part draws upon recent interdisciplinary work in law and political science by Jane Schacter and
others to explain why this is the case.
A. THE ABSENCE OF “REAL” POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY
FOR SPECIFIC POLICY CHOICES
The fact that most citizens lack even basic political knowledge has been almost universally accepted by political scientists for decades.51 For example, survey data has repeatedly
49. See Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dept. of Educ., 127 S. Ct. 1534,
1536–37 (2007) (5–4 decision) (upholding the Secretary’s approach on the
grounds that it reflected a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute).
But see id. at 1551 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (claiming that the Secretary’s interpretation was contrary to the plain meaning of the statute and the majority’s
decision was “nothing other than the elevation of judge-supposed legislative
intent over clear statutory text”).
50. I must confess that I am not the first “comedian” to use this specific
joke. See Philip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, the Congressional Process, and the Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary Critique, 111
YALE L.J. 1707, 1729 n.110 (2002). I have no serious ambitions, however, of
being the last comic standing.
51. See ARTHUR LUPIA & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA 17 (1998) (“The claim that citizens lack political information has a long
and respected history.”); Schacter, supra note 4, at 47 (“It is an article of faith
among political scientists that citizens are woefully uninformed about politics,
and scholars have rarely resorted to understatement in characterizing the
public’s knowledge gaps.”); Somin, supra note 4, at 1304 (“The most important
point established in some five decades of political knowledge research is that
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shown that many citizens are unaware of the identity of their
elected representatives, which political parties are in control of
major public institutions at any given time, and which public
officials or institutions are responsible for various governmental functions.52 Many voters fail to understand basic ideological
concepts, such as the meaning of “liberal” or “conservative.”53
Perhaps most important for present purposes, most American
citizens know “virtually nothing” about the specific policy issues that are resolved by their elected representatives.54 Under
these circumstances, it is implausible to believe that a significant percentage of voters would be familiar with any more than
a handful of the thousands of policy decisions that are made by
the President, members of Congress, or administrative agencies
during the course of an election cycle.55
If citizens do not know about the existence of a policy issue,
they will probably not have formed any meaningful preferences
on its most desirable resolution. Moreover, political scientists
who study public opinion have questioned whether the electorate has preexisting or fixed preferences on many of the issues
that are brought to its attention.56 For example, the results of
public opinion polls frequently depend upon how questions are
the majority of American citizens lack even basic political knowledge.”). For
the leading work of political science on this subject, see MICHAEL X. DELLI
CARPINI & SCOTT KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW ABOUT POLITICS AND
WHY IT MATTERS (1996).
52. Somin, supra note 4, at 1304–06, 1316–17.
53. Id. at 1305–06.
54. See, e.g., John A. Ferejohn, Information and the Electoral Process, in
INFORMATION AND DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES 3, 3 (John A. Ferejohn & James
H. Kuklinski eds., 1990) (“Decades of behavioral research have shown that
most people know little about their elected officeholders, less about their opponents, and virtually nothing about the public issues that occupy officials
from Washington to city hall.”).
55. See Schacter, supra note 4, at 47 (explaining that “[v]oters cannot hold
legislators responsible without sufficient information about what legislators
have, in fact, done” and that the necessary “information consistently eludes
the electorate”); see also Jane S. Schacter, Accounting for Accountability in
Dynamic Statutory Interpretation and Beyond, ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP,
2002, at 1, 13, http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1024&
context=ils (explaining an inability “to find any studies looking in any detail at
the levels of citizen awareness of legislation written and passed by legislators”
with the hypothesis that the public’s lack of “specific information about legislation . . . seems too obvious to warrant study”).
56. See Schacter, supra note 4, at 59–63 (canvassing political science literature on how public policy is formed and identifying “problems with the ability of candidates . . . to reliably identify the content or strength of public attitudes on key issues”).
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posed because respondents often have no preexisting views on
the underlying policy issues and essentially make up their answers on the spot.57 Politicians and interest groups can therefore potentially construct or manufacture “public opinion” that
supports their preexisting policy preferences or use favorable
polling data from independent sources to move public opinion
further in their favored direction.58 To the extent that majoritarian preferences cannot truly be identified and followed by conscientious elected officials, but rather are “crafted” by public officials and other elites for their own purposes, the majority’s
will cannot serve as the autonomous constraint on—or focus
for—decision making by elected officials that is contemplated
by the political accountability paradigm.59
Assuming that a substantial percentage of voters was
aware of a particular governmental decision and had formed
true preferences on the issue, the electorate would still need to
be able to determine who was responsible for the decision to
hold those officials politically accountable. This is not necessarily an easy task for a sophisticated observer of a federal system
of government with separated powers and a host of checks and
balances.60 For example, an environmental activist who was
upset about the inadequate protection of endangered species in
Arizona could plausibly object to policy decisions by Congress,
President Bush, EPA officials, Governor Napolitano, officials
from the Arizona Department of Environmental Quality, and
the United States Supreme Court.61 Moreover, the survey data
shows that deficiencies in voter knowledge are particularly
acute with respect to information that is relevant for assessing

57. JOHN R. ZALLER, THE NATURE AND ORIGINS OF MASS OPINION 76–80
(1992).
58. See LAWRENCE R. JACOBS & ROBERT Y. SHAPIRO, POLITICIANS DON’T
PANDER 112, 115, 119–20 (2000) (describing how the Clinton White House
tried to influence public opinion about health care reform through analyzing
polling data and other methods).
59. See Schacter, supra note 4, at 62–63 (describing recent political
science literature that questions “the notion that the public has extant views
that are tapped into by challengers or reporters who draw attention to incumbents’ votes,” and explaining that “public opinion may be a considerably more
top-down affair, one in which politicians (among others) actively try to shape
and sway public opinion”).
60. See id. at 47 (“[S]orting out who is responsible for particular public
policies is formidably difficult in the context of a multimember legislature,
multibranch government, and federal system.”).
61. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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who is responsible for particular governmental decisions.62 Not
only is the difficulty of accurately attributing blame for unpopular governmental decisions a seemingly undisputed fact of
modern political life (that is, of course, facilitated by some of
the actions of public officials), but the need to improve the ability of citizens to make these determinations has been explicitly
recognized by courts and commentators in a variety of different
contexts.63
Finally, the contemporary understanding of political accountability presumes that voters have the capacity to sanction
a deviant public official for an unpopular decision. This presumption is undermined on several different levels by the realities of modern elections. First, public officials are sometimes
precluded by term limits from seeking reelection.64 Second, incumbents are increasingly shielded from viable competition by
the composition of their electoral districts.65 Third, there is an
ongoing debate in the political science literature regarding
whether voters use elections as opportunities to sanction incumbents for their prior decisions, as opposed to selecting the
best available representative for an upcoming term.66 Although
voters probably take into account both types of considerations,
it is certainly possible for incumbents who have made some
very unpopular decisions to be reelected. In any event, even if
voters based their decisions primarily on the past performance
of their elected representatives, the combined effect of the large
62. See Somin, supra note 4, at 1315 (“[P]ast studies have repeatedly
found that citizens have, at best, a very limited knowledge of how authority
over issue areas is distributed in our complex political system.”).
63. These include federalism decisions by the Supreme Court, see Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), and New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144 (1992), as well as arguments in favor of reviving the nondelegation doctrine and adopting the theory of the unitary executive in constitutional law
and strictly adhering to formal methods of statutory interpretation. For prominent examples of each these respective arguments, see DAVID SCHOENBROD,
POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY 99–106 (1993); Calabresi, supra note 25, at
42–45; and Manning, supra note 33, at 2437.
64. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXII.
65. See Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116
HARV. L. REV. 593, 623–30 (2002) (describing the relation between increased
gerrymandering and incumbent reelection rates); Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court, 2003 Term—Foreword: The Constitutionalization of Democratic
Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 28, 59–64 (2004) (explaining how gerrymandering
has increasingly lowered the level of competition in political races).
66. See Schacter, supra note 6, at 758–59 (explaining that “the very idea
of accountability uncritically assumes a retrospective focus” that implicates
the debate in political science between the “selection or mandate view” and the
“sanctions or accountability” view of voter behavior).

1270

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[93:1253

number of policy decisions that are made by every public official and the limited number of candidates for a particular office
means that an election will necessarily be an exceedingly blunt
and ineffective instrument for the expression of voter preferences on specific policy issues.67
In sum, it is clear that neither the Chief Executive, legislators, nor bureaucrats are politically accountable for their specific policy decisions in the manner that is contemplated by the
prevailing paradigm in modern public law theory. First, the
Executive Office of the President makes countless decisions
that are invisible to the electorate, and even the relatively
small number of decisions that receive some public attention
are not necessarily salient to a majority of voters. Moreover,
White House officials undoubtedly play a major role in a host of
governmental decisions that are never attributed to the President. Even if a first-term President made numerous unpopular
decisions that were transparent, American voters would still
only be presented with one reasonably viable alternative. Finally, the President is not eligible for reelection after his second
term, and he makes far too many decisions, in any event, for
electoral sanctions realistically to come into play on any regular
basis.
The bulk of Congress’s decisions receive even less public
attention and arouse even less public interest than those of the
President. Even when major actions by the entire body or a
single chamber become salient to the general public, the voting
decisions of individual members will routinely escape notice or
be subject to conflicting interpretations. More generally, the
collective nature of an ongoing, multimember institution that is
subject to the requirements of bicameralism and presentment
can make it difficult to ascertain who, if anyone, was responsible for any particular outcome. Although federal legislators are
not subject to term limits, congressional elections are often less
competitive than presidential races and even in closely contested races, most of the specific policy decisions of an incumbent will play little if any role in the outcome.

67. For descriptions of this “bundling” problem, see Farina, supra note 43,
at 998 (“[Bundling] precludes any facile translation of election results into ‘the
people’s will’ on specific policy issues . . . .”); and Peter M. Shane, Political Accountability in a System of Checks and Balances: The Case of Presidential Review of Rulemaking, 48 ARK. L. REV. 161, 197–200 (1994) (describing the limited role of policy considerations in presidential elections).
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Similarly, administrative agencies occasionally make highly visible policy determinations, but the vast majority of regulatory decision making flies beneath the general public’s radar
and implicates established preferences of the electorate only at
very high levels of abstraction. Not only are most voters unlikely to know or care about most administrative decisions, but
they will routinely have difficulty accurately gauging responsibility for those decisions that subsequently prove unpopular.
While some of the highest profile agency decisions might occasionally be attributed to the President, all of the limitations on
his political accountability would exist in this context as well.68
Accordingly, President Bush, for example, cannot be held politically accountable for the federal government’s inept response
to Hurricane Katrina since it happened during his final term in
office.
B. THE LIMITS OF PARTIAL, PROXY, AND DIRECT POLITICAL
ACCOUNTABILITY
It seems indisputable that public officials are not really politically accountable to the electorate for most of their specific
policy decisions. This is particularly true of the vast majority of
routine or technical policy determinations, such as whether to
transfer the EPA’s permitting powers to state officials without
assessing the impact on endangered species, or whether to allow the DOE to consider student population in calculating the
68. The administrative law literature on this topic tends to focus on the
question of whether agency officials are “accountable” to their political principals. The basic theory is that if elected representatives are accountable to
voters, and agencies are, in turn, accountable to elected representatives, then
agency decisions have democratic legitimacy on the grounds that they are sufficiently responsive to the preferences of citizens. See, e.g., McNollgast, The
Political Economy of Law: Decision-Making by Judicial, Legislative, Executive
and Administrative Agencies, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1651,
1663 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Stephen Shavel eds., 2007). My primary claim in
this Article is that elected representatives are not politically accountable to
the voters for their specific policy decisions. Accordingly, the “chain of accountability” that is envisioned by such theories of bureaucratic legitimacy is broken, and agency decisions cannot plausibly be connected to the will of the
people on this basis. The extent to which agency decisions are controlled by
elected officials is therefore beyond the scope of this Article. Nonetheless, to
the extent that agency decisions are controlled by elected officials and elected
officials are not politically accountable to the voters, the “logic of collective action” would suggest that this form of political control will be affirmatively
problematic in the absence of other mechanisms for holding public officials accountable for their decisions. See. id. at 1714 (“If elected officials are a willing
co-conspirator in agency capture, evidence that they influence policy will not
assuage fears that the public interest is subverted.”).
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per pupil expenditures of local school districts. The same conclusion would not necessarily hold, however, with respect to a
small number of “momentous” or culturally significant decisions—such as whether to prohibit “partial birth abortions” or
regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles to
limit the pace of global warming.69 It is therefore worthwhile to
pause for a moment to consider the nature and degree of political accountability for this much narrower category of policy
choices.
The primary difference between the routine and the momentous for purposes of political accountability appears to stem
from the increased likelihood that voters will find out about a
“momentous” policy decision and have—or at least develop—an
established preference on the issue. There are, however, still
reasons to doubt that elected officials are regularly held politically accountable even for their most visible policy choices.
First, there may be ongoing difficulties associated with accurately identifying who is responsible for a particular policy decision. For example, the EPA argued that it lacked statutory
authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new cars
under the Clean Air Act, 70 which would presumably have
shifted responsibility for the failure to counteract global warming from the executive branch to Congress. Moreover, the voting decisions of individual members of Congress on the Partial
Birth Abortion Act of 2003 might not be known by, or accurately conveyed to, the general electorate, even if voters wanted to
use this information as the basis for their reelection decision.
One well-known study reported, for example, that less than
twenty percent of survey respondents could identify a single
vote by their representative in the House over the preceding
two years.71
Second, if voters accurately identified who was responsible
for a momentous policy decision, those public officials might not
face any political consequences. For starters, voters who favored a ban on “partial birth abortion” and efforts to combat
global warming (and, say, strongly oppose the war in Iraq and
same-sex marriage)—that is to say, an apparent majority of
American citizens—may be facing difficult choices at the time
69. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 2518, 2521–22 (2007); Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1440–41 (2007).
70. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1450.
71. See George F. Bishop et al., What Must My Interest in Politics Be If I
Just Told You “I Don’t Know”?, 48 PUB. OPINION Q. 210 (1984).
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of an election. In any event, President Bush is not subject to
electoral accountability for any of his second-term decisions.
Legislators with safe seats are in essentially the same position,
at least as long as they adhere to their party lines on issues of
this nature.72
The fact that there is a party line on issues of this nature
may further limit the electoral consequences of an incumbent’s
specific policy decisions because many of the voters who know
and care about their resolution are inclined to vote for the party line as well. The net effect may be that (1) committed Republicans oppose partial birth abortion and regulation of greenhouse gases and vote in favor of Republican candidates; (2)
committed Democrats proceed in precisely the opposite fashion;
and (3) contested elections are decided by “the median voter.”
Yet, the median voter is the median voter largely because she
does not necessarily have fixed or consistent preferences on issues of this nature. Accordingly, the median voter should be interested to know that the failure to adopt an exception for the
preservation of the mother’s health provided a constitutional
and policy basis for opposing the Partial Birth Abortion Act of
2003, even for representatives with stated objections to the procedure. Because a competitive election could, in theory, be influenced by whether this type of information was accurately
conveyed to voters, candidates for office (and their allies) have
powerful incentives to distort the voting records of their opponents. At the end of the day, it seems doubtful that median voters have sufficient information about momentous policy decisions to adopt fully informed preferences on those issues—
much less that they make electoral decisions on that basis. Rather, because most policy issues are complex and election campaigns are not conducive to reasoned (or even candid) deliberation about their details, most voters base their election
decisions on information shortcuts or cues that simplify the
task of choosing the preferable candidate in light of all of the
potentially relevant considerations.
It is conceivable, perhaps, that these information shortcuts
could compensate for the large gaps in the electorate’s political
knowledge and thereby provide a form of “proxy accountability.”73 Political scientists have recently claimed that voters can,
72. Cf. Schacter, supra note 4, at 66 (pointing out that primary elections
may be “the more important elections in contemporary politics” in light of “the
prevalence of safe seats in Congress”).
73. See id. at 50 (examining whether recent work in political science

1274

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[93:1253

in fact, make rational decisions based on limited information if
they are exposed to simple cues that tell them, for example,
what better informed individuals or groups think about the
matter in a context that allows voters to assess the trustworthiness of the speaker.74 The idea is that if voters can accurately decide which candidates they prefer based on party labels,
endorsements, or other simple cues, elected officials could be
held politically accountable in a manner that comports with
modern public law theory.75
The scholars who have examined this precise question
have persuasively concluded that although information shortcuts of this nature can be helpful, their potential availability
does not establish that elected officials are politically accountable to the voters for their policy decisions. Many voters have insufficient political knowledge to use information shortcuts effectively, and in the absence of the requisite background
information, voting cues of this nature can be affirmatively
misleading.76 The use of information shortcuts is also likely to
entrench existing social inequalities and create substantial
risks of voter manipulation because of the biased nature of
many of the sources, the reductionist nature of persuasive political argumentation, and systemic disparities in political knowledge that render some citizens more reliant on lower-quality
information.77 Finally, the available voting cues are far too
general and haphazard to enable voters to hold elected officials
politically accountable for their policy decisions based on this
information.78 For example, voters often rely upon the performance of the national economy in presidential elections, and a

might provide a basis for “proxy theories of accountability by identifying substitutes for the kind of informational environment that might make actual accountability possible”(emphasis omitted)).
74. See, e.g., LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note 51, at 64 (explaining that
concepts like reputation, party, or ideology are useful heuristics if they convey
information about knowledge and trust).
75. See Schacter, supra note 4, at 51–52.
76. See Somin, supra note 4, at 1320–23; see also Schacter, supra note 4,
at 64–65 (recognizing that “[v]arious scholars make the basic point that it is
difficult for voters to use shortcuts well when they lack the necessary background knowledge to make sense of the shortcuts themselves,” and observing
that “[t]herein lies the paradox: The voters arguably most in need of cues are
also those least able to make good use of them”).
77. See Schacter, supra note 4, at 66–68.
78. See id. at 65–68.
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heavily used voting cue in House elections is the name recognition of an incumbent who is running for reelection.79
Similar fundamental problems also undermine the possibility that political accountability could consistently be
achieved by the need for politicians to predict how their constituents would react to a policy decision if it were brought to
their attention.80 In this regard, political scientists have argued
that the electorate’s lack of information about politics can be
overcome by the fact that elected officials must anticipate the
preferences of their constituents to avoid making decisions that
could be used against them in future elections.81 If this is the
case, then elected officials might be responsive to the will of the
people even if the voters are generally unaware of it.82 As with
the use of voting cues, this phenomenon does exist and it may
help the electorate exercise some control over policy discretion
without engaging in vigilant oversight of public officials, but reliance upon the “potential anticipated response of voters” will
not hold politicians accountable for most of their specific policy
decisions and may raise other serious problems as well.
The bottom line, once again, is that it is completely unrealistic to believe that a politician’s need to predict how her constituents would respond to a particular decision if it were
brought to their attention makes elected officials politically accountable for the bulk of their policy choices.83 Although it ap79. See ZALLER, supra note 57, at 244–45 (discussing the importance of
name recognition in House elections); Schacter, supra note 4, at 65 (explaining
that the performance of the economy is a “venerable cue” in presidential elections even though experts have concluded that the President has an exceedingly modest ability to control short-term economic performance).
80. See Schacter, supra note 4, at 50 (describing the possibility of “accountability through prediction”).
81. See R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 3–
16, 82–87 (1990); MORRIS P. FIORINA, REPRESENTATIVES, ROLL CALLS, AND
CONSTITUENCIES 43–63 (1974); V.O. KEY, JR., PUBLIC OPINION AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 496–99 (1961); JOHN W. KINGDON, CONGRESSMEN’S VOTING DECISIONS 67–68 (3d ed. 1989); DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL
CONNECTION 36–37 (1975) (“The ultimate concern . . . is not how probable it is
that legislatures will lose their seats but whether there is a connection between what they do in office and their need to be reelected.”).
82. See Schacter, supra note 4, at 50 (“On this view, politicians’ steady
contemplation of potential voter preferences might support a version of accountability, even if voters themselves never assert or even perceive those preferences.”).
83. See id. at 54–63 (rejecting the possibility of achieving accountability
through prediction based on the problems associated with implementing the
theory and its propensities to accept existing inequalities and encourage manipulative behavior by elected officials and other elites).
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pears at first glance that this phenomenon could at least provide political accountability for momentous decisions that are
likely to reach the public agenda, this conclusion is called into
question by the poor quality of political debate and the ability
of politicians and interest groups to manufacture public opinion
that corresponds with their own preferences.84 For example, the
pro-life lobby and right wing of the Republican Party have apparently succeeded in generating substantial public opposition
to “partial-birth abortion.”85 It is far less clear, however, that a
majority of voters favors a prohibition on this procedure in the
absence of an exception for the preservation of the health of the
mother.86 Yet, a member of Congress who only favored a ban on
the knowing performance of the intact dilation and evacuation
procedure for terminating a pregnancy with the aforementioned exception (consistent with the apparent preferences of a
majority of voters) may have been forced into voting in favor of
the Partial Birth Abortion Act of 2003 based on a legitimate
fear that a contrary vote could be used against her at the next
election. Similarly, the mounting public support for legislative
action to counteract global warming that is being generated by
environmental activists and the left wing of the Democratic
Party could lead members of Congress to support severely
flawed legislative proposals to avoid potential electoral retribution. Not only are political calculations of this nature therefore
uncertain to result in action that truly comports with majoritarian preferences, but a realistic fear that voters will subsequently be misled about an incumbent’s voting record could
even push decisions about important details of major policy issues away from the preferences that would be held by a more
fully informed electorate. The ultimate irony, then, is that far
from promoting political accountability, the electorate’s reliance
on information shortcuts and an incumbent’s need to consider
how voters might respond to her decisions could actually combine to undermine majoritarian preferences in certain situations.
84. See id. at 59–63; supra notes 56–59 and accompanying text.
85. See MORRIS P. FIORINA, CULTURE WAR? 55–56 & n.5 (2005) (reporting
that “large majorities of Americans have consistently registered opposition to
this particular procedure,” and suggesting that a focus on this procedure by
pro-life groups may have been responsible for moving overall public opinion on
abortion “a bit in a conservative direction in the late 1990s”).
86. See id. at 54–56 (reporting that “huge majorities” of Americans consistently support legal access to abortions when “the woman’s health is seriously
endangered”).
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For similar reasons, the increased use of direct democracy
to make discretionary policy choices would neither obviate the
need for democratic accountability nor necessarily enhance the
political accountability that exists in our democracy. Despite
widespread rhetoric that direct democracy constitutes lawmaking by “the people,” initiative proponents are the dominant
force in successful ballot campaigns.87 Moreover, several features of the ballot initiative process increase the risk that successful ballot measures will have collateral consequences that
were not anticipated or approved by the voters.88 Although
some political scientists have been optimistic about the benefits
of information shortcuts in the ballot initiative context,89 most
voters can only use the available cues, at best, to cast a rational
ballot on the broad objective of a proposal. This literature
therefore does not support the conclusion that voters have sufficient information to accurately express their preferences on
the specific legal consequences of successful ballot measures. As
is true in the context of candidate elections, the information
shortcuts that are available in the ballot initiative context are
simply too general to attribute many of the particular consequences of this lawmaking process to the will of the people. At
the same time, the initiative proponents who are in a position
to understand and control these particular matters are not politically accountable to anyone for their decisions.
87. See Staszewski, supra note 38, at 420–35 (describing the dominant
role and substantial influence of initiative proponents); see also DAVID S.
BRODER, DEMOCRACY DERAILED 91–161 (2000) (describing the “initiative war
in close-up”); Philip P. Frickey, Interpretation on the Borderline: Constitution,
Canons, Direct Democracy, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 477, 519 (“Direct democracy consists of two separate processes: proposal by well-organized interests and
ratification by the electorate.”); Schacter, supra note 39, at 111 (“[T]he direct
lawmaking process gives powerful leverage to initiative drafters, who are situated to construct a phantom popular intent through strategic drafting.”).
88. See Glen Staszewski, The Bait-and-Switch in Direct Democracy, 2006
WIS. L. REV. 17, 32–39 (describing this problem).
89. See Arthur Lupia & John G. Matsusaka, Direct Democracy: New Approaches to Old Questions, 7 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 463, 467–70 (2004) (reporting
that recent studies have questioned the notion that the absence of detailed
knowledge about the substance of ballot measures prevents the electorate
from voting consistent with its preferences); see also SHAUN BOWLER & TODD
DONOVAN, DEMANDING CHOICES 21–42 (1998); LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra
note 51; Arthur Lupia, Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
63, 72 (1994) (“[T]he availability of certain types of information cues allows
voters to use their limited resources efficiently while influencing electoral outcomes in ways that they would have if they had taken the time and effort necessary to acquire encyclopedic information.”).
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III. THE DELIBERATIVE ACCOUNTABILITY PARADIGM
The realization that elected officials are not really politically accountable for their specific policy choices has far-reaching
implications. For those who hinge democratic legitimacy on majoritarian support for policy decisions, it calls the entire validity
of the modern regulatory state into question. Only somewhat
less dramatically, it highlights a potentially fatal flaw in modern public law theories, which accord heightened legitimacy to
decisions by “politically accountable” institutions, regardless of
the process by which they were enacted or their substantive
merits. In short, the preceding Part demonstrates that the dominant paradigm in modern public law is implausible because
public officials are not held politically accountable for their specific policy decisions pursuant to periodic elections.
Because our instinctive desire for democratic accountability is based on more fundamental commitments to ensuring the
legitimacy of governmental authority and avoiding arbitrary
decisions, we should consider the possibility of another paradigm of democratic accountability that is based on different features of republican government. This Part draws upon deliberative democratic theory to develop this alternative paradigm by
claiming that public officials in a democracy can be held accountable by a requirement or expectation that they give reasoned explanations for their decisions. First, reason-giving
promotes accountability by limiting the scope of available discretion and ensuring that public officials provide publicregarding justifications for their decisions. Second, reasongiving facilitates transparency, which, in turn, enables citizens
and other public officials to evaluate, discuss, and criticize governmental action, as well as potentially to seek legal or political reform. Most fundamentally, reason-giving fosters democratic legitimacy because it both embodies, and provides the
preconditions for, a deliberative democracy that seeks to
achieve consensus on ways of promoting the public good that
take the views of political minorities into account. In the course
of setting forth an alternative paradigm, this Part compares
some of the central features of deliberative and political accountability and responds to potential objections.
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A. THE VALUE OF REASON-GIVING
The word “accountable” means that one is “required or expected to justify actions or decisions.”90 Although dictionary definitions, standing alone, should certainly not always be dispositive,91 my contention is that public officials in a democracy
can be held deliberatively accountable by a requirement or expectation that they give reasoned explanations for their decisions. First, reason-giving promotes accountability by limiting
the scope of available discretion. Because collective policy
choices in a democracy cannot be justified solely on the basis of
self-interest, public officials are expected to give publicregarding justifications for their decisions.92 Although the need
90. WORDPERFECT 10 WORDPROCESSOR DICTIONARY. Although the source
of this quotation shows that it was incredibly easy to find a definition of accountability that comports with my view, more sophisticated examples are certainly available. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486,
509–12 (2002) (explaining that psychological studies of “accountability” use
the term to refer “to the implicit or explicit expectation that one may be called
on to justify one’s beliefs, feelings, and actions to others,” and noting that although the term “also usually implies that people who do not provide a satisfactory justification for their actions will suffer negative consequences,” those
consequences need not be material and may include contemptuous glances or
even feelings of disappointment in one’s own performance) (quoting Jennifer S.
Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of Accountability, 125
PSYCHOL. BULL. 255, 255 (1999)).
91. Cf. Glen Staszewski, Avoiding Absurdity, 81 IND. L.J. 1001 (2006)
(providing a theoretical defense of the canon of statutory interpretation that
authorizes the judiciary to deviate from the “plain meaning” of statutory language to avoid “absurd results”).
92. See Jon Elster, Deliberation and Constitution Making, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 97, 104 (Jon Elster ed., 1998) (“Because there are powerful
norms against naked appeals to interest or prejudice, speakers have to justify
their proposals by the public interest.”). For influential ideals of this requirement, see GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at 52–94 (describing a principle of “reciprocity,” which requires citizens and officials to “appeal to reasons
or principles that can be shared by fellow citizens who are similarly motivated” when they “make moral claims in a deliberative democracy”); Joshua
Cohen, Democracy and Liberty, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra, at 185,
193–98 (describing a deliberative process in which participants regard one
another as free, equal, and reasonable “in that they aim to defend and criticize
institutions and programs in terms of considerations that others, as free and
equal, have reason to accept, given the fact of reasonable pluralism and on the
assumption that those others are themselves concerned to provide suitable
justifications” (emphasis omitted)); John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 765, 773 (1997) (“A citizen engages in public reason
. . . when he or she deliberates within a framework of what he or she sincerely
regards as the most reasonable political conception of justice, a conception that
expresses political values that others, as free and equal citizens might also
reasonably be expected reasonably to endorse.”).
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to explain why a particular policy choice would promote the
public good may not pose a substantial constraint in many cases, a reasoned decision-making requirement helps to eliminate
official self-dealing and “naked preferences” for one individual
or group over another.93 Perhaps more important, an expectation that public officials will provide public-regarding justifications for their decisions changes the nature of legitimate deliberation in the policy-making process.94 It is not enough for a
decision maker to follow her own or her constituents’ prepolitical preferences, but she must instead be capable of explaining why a particular course of action is best for the community as a whole.95 Because public officials must provide public-regarding justifications for their decisions, other
participants in the process have incentives to articulate their
claims in public-regarding terms as well. As a result, relatively
selfish policy options may be discarded in favor of more publicspirited alternatives at the outset of the policy-making
process,96 and subsequent deliberations conducted pursuant to
this principle can expose additional common ground.97
93. See Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COL. REV. 1689 (1984) (“If naked preferences are forbidden . . . and the government is forced to invoke some public value to justify its conduct, government behavior becomes constrained.”).
94. See Elster, supra note 92, at 100 (“The mere fact that an assembly of
individuals defines its task as that of deliberation rather than mere forcebased bargaining exercises a powerful influence on the proposals and arguments that can be made.”).
95. This is an essential component of civic republican theory. See Mark
Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105
HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1531–32 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican
Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1547–51 (1988) [hereinafter Sunstein, Republican
Revival]; Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN.
L. REV. 29, 31–32 (1985) [hereinafter Sunstein, Interest Groups].
96. See Elster, supra note 92, at 104 (claiming that the obligation to provide a public-regarding justification creates an incentive for speakers to modify their positions in a less selfish direction because “a perfect coincidence between private interest or prejudice and impartial argument is suspicious”).
97. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at 43 (“Through the give
and take of argument, citizens and their accountable representatives can learn
from one another, come to recognize their individual and collective mistakes,
and develop new views and policies that are more widely justifiable.”); James
D. Fearon, Deliberation as Discussion, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra
note 92, at 44, 52 (“[O]ne reason a group might want to discuss something rather than simply voting on it is to lessen the effects of bounded rationality,
and discussion may serve this purpose, even when there are known conflicting
interests in the group.”); Bernard Manin, On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation, 15 POL. THEORY 338, 350 (Elly Stein & Jane Mansbridge trans., 1987)
(“[D]uring political deliberation, individuals acquire new perspectives not only
LUM.
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The practice of reason-giving further limits the scope of
available discretion over time by encouraging public officials to
treat similarly situated persons alike and to treat differently
situated persons differently. Frederick Schauer has pointed out
that when individuals give reasoned explanations for their decisions, they routinely invoke relatively general principles to
justify their chosen courses of action.98 By making a public
commitment to respect those general principles, public officials
can be expected to follow them to their logical conclusion whenever they are shown to be applicable.99 If public officials subsequently deviate from the apparent import of their previously
articulated principles, they can be expected to provide a reasoned explanation for why the situation at hand is distinguishable. Reason-giving therefore has the capacity to promote the
equal treatment of regulated parties, and to achieve greater
overall coherence in the law. Thus, reason-giving allows for the
establishment and operation of a system of common-law-style
precedent that public officials can be expected to follow or refine when subsequent controversies arise.
Second, reason-giving promotes accountability by facilitating transparency in government. If citizens are unaware that a
particular governmental official has made a specific policy decision, they cannot possibly hold that official accountable in any
meaningful way for this action. A requirement or expectation
that the public official will provide a reasoned explanation for
the decision enables interested citizens and other public officials to evaluate, discuss, and criticize the action, as well as potentially to seek political or legal reform. For this process to
work, the reasons that governmental officials provide for their
decisions must ordinarily be publicly available.100 Moreover,
with respect to possible solutions, but also with respect to their own preferences”); Robert B. Reich, Public Administration and Public Deliberation: An
Interpretive Essay, 94 YALE L.J. 1617, 1635–37 (1985) (explaining that
“[d]uring the course of deliberation, people may discover both new information
and new perspectives about what is at stake in the decision before them,”
which may lead them both “to modify their choice of means for achieving their
ends” and “perhaps to reconsider those ends”).
98. See Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 641
(1995).
99. See id. at 649 (“[G]iving a reason creates a prima facie commitment on
the part of the reason giver to decide subsequent cases in accordance with that
reason.”).
100. For an extensive discussion of “the value of publicity” in deliberative
democracy, as well as some potentially legitimate exceptions to this general
principle, see GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at 95–127. For a recent
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when an official’s explanation for her decision is based on empirical claims, they should be based upon reliable methods of
inquiry and consistent with available information.101 Although
a patently false explanation could eventually be disproved, the
whole point of a reasoned explanation is to justify a decision on
the merits to someone who may not share the official’s overarching point of view.102 It would therefore be illegitimate to
trick other public officials or citizens into accepting a policy decision based upon false information. At the same time, a requirement or expectation that policy choices will be publicly
justified in a manner that is consistent with reliable methods of
inquiry and available empirical information encourages the use
of technical expertise in the modern regulatory state.
In addition to providing instrumental benefits by constraining official discretion and promoting transparency in government, an obligation to provide reasons for policy decisions
that could reasonably be accepted by free and equal citizens
with competing perspectives performs the more fundamental
function of promoting the legitimacy of government authority
in a democracy.103 Consent-based theories of legitimacy are notoriously problematic in the absence of unanimity, apart from
the difficulties associated with implementing the will of the
people that were explored above.104 Moreover, contrary to the
usual assumption, people do not typically enter into the political process with fully formed preferences on specific policy issues. Rather, they routinely have a host of beliefs, values, and
interests that are not fully consistent with one another. Deliberative democratic theorists have therefore emphasized that
reasoned deliberation helps decision-makers to ascertain their
own policy preferences by providing them with useful information and competing perspectives about the ideal resolution of a
problem.105 Because this discussion can simultaneously build a
broad consensus around a particular solution, the process of
discussion of the potential drawbacks of public deliberation, see ADRIAN VER-

MEULE, MECHANISMS OF DEMOCRACY 195 (2007).
101. See GUTTMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 7,

at 15, 56.
102. See supra notes 92–95 and accompanying text.
103. See, e.g., Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in
THE GOOD POLITY, 17, 21 (Alan Hamlin & Philip Pettit eds., 1989); Manin, supra note 97, at 340, 388; see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 17 (1993) (“In American constitutional law, government must always
have a reason for what it does.”).
104. See Manin, supra note 97, at 341–44.
105. See id. at 349–50.
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reasoned deliberation helps to legitimize specific policy choices
from the standpoint of the prevailing majority. From this perspective, it is doubtful that public officials could make legitimate
policy choices without developing good reasons for taking particular courses of action over the available alternatives.
Deliberative democratic decisions are also legitimate from
the standpoint of the minority. Although everyone might theoretically consent to a majority voting procedure because it
treats everyone equally and offers opportunities for various
groups to prevail on different issues, the validity of this consent
would be significantly enhanced if the interests and perspectives of the minority were taken into account in reaching a decision.106 Indeed, deliberative democratic theorists have gone
one step further and claimed that public policies adopted by a
majority can only be legitimate if the minority’s interests and
perspectives were adequately considered during the decisionmaking process and the prevailing outcome is one that “could
be the object of a free and reasoned agreement among
equals.”107
Reason-giving can therefore be understood as the enforcement mechanism that holds public officials accountable for
making legitimate policy choices in a deliberative democracy. A
requirement or expectation that public officials will give reasoned explanations for their policy decisions that could reasonably be accepted by free and equal citizens with competing
perspectives helps to ensure that the government makes valid
choices based on the best available information and that the interests and perspectives of minorities are adequately considered. Some prominent legal scholars have, in fact, recently argued from this basic perspective that reason-giving is
fundamental to the political and moral legitimacy of a democracy and that elected representatives have a constitutionally
mandated obligation to provide reasons for their policy decisions.108 Regardless of whether it is constitutionally required,
106. See generally Rebecca L. Brown, The Logic of Majority Rule, 9 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 23 (2006).
107. Cohen, supra note 103, at 22; see also Manin, supra note 97, at 359–60
(explaining that the principle of majority rule is only justified if “[t]he decision
results from a [deliberative] process in which the minority point of view was
also taken into consideration”).
108. For these respective arguments, see Jerry L. Mashaw, Reasoned Administration: The European Union, the United States, and the Project of Democratic Governance, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 99, 116 (2007); Brown, supra note
106, at 41.
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reason-giving can certainly be understood as a viable alternative to elections for purposes of holding public officials democratically accountable for their specific policy choices.109
B. DISTINGUISHING DELIBERATIVE AND POLITICAL
ACCOUNTABILITY
The deliberative accountability that is fostered by reasongiving differs in some fundamental ways from the political accountability that is currently envisioned by modern public law
theory. First, rather than limiting the time frame during which
public officials can be called to account to the holding of periodic elections, deliberative accountability is a far more dynamic
phenomenon that frequently begins when a policy question is
first being considered, it reaches a crescendo when responsible
public officials make a significant decision, and it potentially
continues indefinitely while the opponents of the existing status quo press for legal or political change in a variety of institutional settings.110 The American public law system allows
elected officials to enact statutes, which are typically implemented by administrative agencies, reviewed by courts, and potentially modified by subsequent legislative action.111 Because
policy making in this system is fluid, provisional, and dialogic,
we need a theory of accountability that can potentially keep
pace with the realities of the process. Unlike political accountability, deliberative accountability can meet this challenge because it recognizes that public officials (and others) should give
reasoned explanations for their decisions at each stage of the
policy-making process.112
Second, rather than focusing almost exclusively on the
agency relationship between elected officials and their voting
109. Cf. Mashaw, supra note 108, at 124 (recognizing that “[t]he alternative to will-based democratic theories are theories based on some vision of public reason,” and claiming that “administration without reason cannot meet the
challenge of defending its democratic legitimacy”).
110. Cf. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at 142–43 (describing “the
reiteration of deliberation” and explaining that “[i]nstead of the arbitrary moments of accountability that elections offer, deliberative democracy provides
an ongoing process” that “continues through stages, as officials present their
proposals, citizens respond, officials revise, citizens react, and the stages recur”).
111. See infra notes 185–88 and accompanying text (describing the American public law system).
112. See infra notes 183–89 and accompanying text (endorsing a framework of separated powers that envisions “a checking and balancing circle of
deliberative circles”).
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constituents, deliberative accountability provides a more comprehensive way of accommodating the full array of relations
that are implicated by policy-making decisions. For starters, an
authoritative decision maker has a responsibility to herself to
reach a decision that she finds acceptable in light of her knowledge of the relevant facts and circumstances.113 Social scientists and philosophers have recognized that reason-giving is an
innate characteristic of human beings that is associated with
our ability to rationally evaluate and justify our actions.114
From this perspective, we do not necessarily need to give reasons to anyone for reason-giving to carry intrinsic meaning. On
the other hand, elected officials in a democracy do have special
obligations to their constituents and other public officials to
consider their interests and perspectives and to provide reasoned explanations for policy choices that take these considerations into account.115 At the same time, deliberative accountability is not limited to an obligation by elected officials to
consider (much less mechanically follow) the preferences of
their voting constituents on each particular issue.116 Rather,
public officials in a deliberative democracy also have an obligation to consider the interests and perspectives of everyone who
will be bound by a decision,117 as well as other persons who
could subsequently be affected, including noncitizens and
people who have yet to be born.118 Deliberative accountability is
therefore capable of transcending electoral boundaries and encouraging public officials to reach the best possible decisions on
113. See John Gardner, The Mark of Responsibility (with a Postscript on
Accountability), in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 11, at 220, 220–43.
114. See CHARLES TILLY, WHY? 8 (2006) (“While, by some definitions, other
primates employ language, tools, and even culture, only humans start offering
and demanding reasons while young, then continue through life looking for
reasons why.”); Gardner, supra note 113, at 221 (“As rational beings we cannot
but aim at excellence in rationality.”).
115. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at 128–29 (“Representatives are first of all accountable to voters, and to others with whom they have
some special relationship (such as supporters of their party).”).
116. Cf. Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 95, at 41–43 (describing
Madison’s vision of representation).
117. See supra notes 106–07 and accompanying text.
118. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at 144–64 (discussing “the
problem of constituency” in a deliberative democracy and claiming that the
principle of accountability requires that “representatives justify their actions
from a moral point of view, which implies that they owe an account not only to
their electoral constituents but also to what we may call their moral constituents—citizens in other states and other nations, groups of disadvantaged citizens, and citizens yet to be born”).
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the merits in light of the entire range of competing perspectives
and affected interests.
Third, while political accountability rests upon the power
of segments of the electorate to sanction deviant public officials,
deliberative accountability is premised on the need for public
officials and citizens to persuade one another of the merits of
their positions. Instead of privileging political power, deliberative accountability emphasizes the obligation of public officials
and citizens to engage with one another on the substance of policy issues with an attitude of mutual respect.119 Reason-giving
initially fosters self-respect by allowing public officials to do
what they believe is appropriate under the circumstances based
upon the best available information. Because participants in
the policy-making process can be expected to give reasons for
their positions that could be accepted by free and equal persons
with fundamentally competing perspectives, however, deliberative accountability simultaneously encourages public officials
(and others) to respect alternative views and interests and be
open to revising their initial preferences based on additional information.120 Thus, a requirement or expectation that public officials will provide a reasoned explanation for their decisions
should be understood as a defining feature of republican democracy,121 at least as important as periodic elections, because
it forces public officials to treat citizens who are bound by their
decisions with the proper degree of respect. While it may be appropriate for a parent to respond to a child’s request for an explanation with the witty repartee, “because I said so,” or, more
authoritatively, “because I’m your [parent] and I said so,” this
merely demonstrates that families are not necessarily democracies. In a true democracy, citizens are ordinarily entitled to
a more meaningful explanation for the official exercise of coercive authority.
119. See Sunstein, Republican Revival, supra note 95, at 1549–50 (“The antonym of deliberation is the imposition of outcomes by self-interested and politically powerful private groups.”). On the respect that is fostered by reasoned
deliberation, see GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at 18 (“When citizens
deliberate in democratic politics, they express and respect their status as political equals even as they continue to disagree about important matters of public policy.”); Cohen, supra note 92, at 186 (explaining that in the deliberative
conception of democracy, “citizens treat one another as equals . . . by offering
them justifications for the exercise of collective power framed in terms of considerations that can, roughly speaking, be acknowledged by all as reasons”).
120. See, e.g., Manin, supra note 97, at 349–64 (explaining how deliberation can shape individual preferences and achieve collective legitimacy).
121. See supra notes 108–09 and accompanying text.
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Finally, rather than viewing any policy outcome that is
presumptively supported by a majority of voters as legitimate,
deliberative accountability maintains that the legitimacy of a
policy decision is a function of both its procedural and substantive validity.122 Thus, as explained above, public officials should
ordinarily be expected to give reasoned explanations for their
decisions that are publicly available. Moreover, the reasons
provided should be public-regarding and potentially acceptable
to free and equal persons with fundamentally competing perspectives, as well as consistent with the best available empirical
evidence. Public officials and other citizens should therefore be
willing, and even expected, to consider changing their positions
in light of new information or arguments. At the same time,
policy makers should follow their previously articulated principles on an even-handed and consistent basis and be capable of
providing reasoned explanations for alleged deviations from
prior courses of action.
C. POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS
Critics of deliberative democracy who have absorbed the
lessons of legal realism and been conditioned to understand law
and politics in a pluralistic fashion routinely dismiss the quest
for deliberative consensus or agreement on the grounds that an
objective public interest does not exist. This criticism, which is
most likely a holdover from the elitist political thinking of Edmund Burke,123 reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of
contemporary theories of deliberative democracy that seek to
facilitate deliberative consensus or agreement in the face of intractable moral disagreement.124 The idea is not that reasoned
122. See, e.g., GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at 27; Cohen, supra
note 92, at 187.
123. See Roberto Gargarella, Full Representation, Deliberation, and Impartiality, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra note 92, at 260, 263–64 (describing “Burke’s model” of deliberative democracy and explaining that there is
“plain textual evidence . . . of the confidence he had in deliberation as a means
for achieving ‘correct’ political decisions”).
124. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at 1 (explaining that the
core idea of deliberative democracy is that “when citizens and their representatives disagree morally, they should continue to reason together to reach mutually acceptable decisions”); Cohen, supra note 92, at 187–93 (describing his
assumption of “the fact of reasonable pluralism: the fact that there are distinct, incompatible philosophies of life to which reasonable people are drawn
under favorable conditions for the exercise of practical reason”); Rawls, supra
note 92, at 765–66 (“[A] basic feature of democracy is the fact of reasonable
pluralism—the fact that a plurality of conflicting reasonable comprehensive
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deliberation will eliminate fundamental moral disagreement or
lead to the discovery of uniquely correct answers to controversial policy questions, but rather that it will compel participants
in the policy-making process to respect fundamentally divergent perspectives, while simultaneously improving the quality
of the particular policy decisions that are rendered through the
pooling of both information and ideas, and the utilization of
substantive expertise.125 Although a substantial degree of reasonable disagreement will undoubtedly remain, the process of
reasoned deliberation should facilitate tentative resolutions to
specific policy questions that are more widely acceptable to a
broader range of interests, partly as a function of eliminating
certain objectionable types of reasons for action from consideration in the public arena.126 In short, the underlying hope is that
if we take unduly partial reasons for acting off the table, provide decision-makers with the best available empirical information, and encourage them to resolve the problem through deliberations that are conducted in a spirit of mutual respect and
cooperation, the final policy decision is likely to be the most legitimate and meritorious option under the circumstances.
One could, of course, still raise several potential objections
to the claim that public officials in a democracy can be held accountable by a requirement that they give reasoned explanations for their decisions. First, it is possible that public officials
and other citizens will provide insincere reasons for their policy
decisions.127 While motivated primarily by their own selfish interests or those of powerful constituents, participants in the
policy-making process could still satisfy the demands of deliberative accountability by providing certain public-regarding
justifications for their positions. The concern is not only that
rent-seeking policy choices would thereby be accorded false legitimacy, but that a requirement or expectation that public officials provide reasoned explanations for their decisions creates
an affirmative incentive for such duplicity. From this perspec-

doctrines, religious, philosophical, and moral, is the normal result of its culture of free institutions.”).
125. See Fearon, supra note 97, at 44–68 (cataloguing potential benefits of
reasoned deliberation); supra notes 119–22 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 92–97 and accompanying text.
127. See, e.g., Fearon, supra note 97, at 47 (“The principal dilemma for discussion as a means of revealing private information relevant to a political
choice is that people can have strategic incentives to misrepresent their preferences or special knowledge.”).
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tive, voters should be encouraged to judge public officials not by
what they say, but rather by what they do.
While there is little doubt that public officials and other
citizens sometimes give insincere reasons for their policy decisions, this situation does not severely undermine the significance of deliberative accountability.128 First, the prospect of
judging public officials solely by what they do falsely assumes
that the prevailing paradigm of political accountability is actually effective.129 Second, the fact that a public official provided a reasoned explanation for a decision hardly forecloses
one’s ability to remain unpersuaded or to challenge any accompanying legal or political action. Rather, the existence of deliberative accountability enables citizens to contest both what
public officials have said and what they have done. Although
the provision of a reasoned explanation bolsters the legitimacy
of governmental action, it need not necessarily increase its
popularity or the extent to which there is societal agreement on
the matter.130 In addition to the benefits described above, deliberative accountability is premised on a conviction that it is
more productive to debate the merits of particular policy choices, rather than trying to ascertain or impugn the motives of
those who have taken a position.131 It would admittedly be preferable if public officials and citizens regularly provided genuine reasons for their positions, but insincerity does not eliminate our ability to evaluate the merits of their choices or the
explanations that they have provided to justify them. On the
contrary, insincere explanations are more likely to be vulnerable to criticism.132
128. The notion of deliberative accountability that is set forth here differs
in this respect from some prominent theories of deliberative democracy. See
John M. Kang, The Irrelevance of Sincerity: Deliberative Democracy in the Supreme Court, 48 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 305, 306 (2004) (identifying several prominent theorists of deliberative democracy who have advocated sincerity in public discourse). For a similar perspective to my own, see Elster, supra note 92,
at 100–05 (“[A] deliberative setting can shape outcomes independently of the
motives of the participants.” (emphasis omitted)).
129. See supra Part II (describing the weaknesses of political accountability).
130. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at 73–91 (discussing legitimate ways of dealing with “deliberative disagreement”).
131. See id. at 171 (“Utilitarians rightly remind us that attacks on motive
and character distract citizens from the substance of issues.”).
132. The use of “strict scrutiny” in constitutional law has been justified
partly on the same underlying basis. See, e.g., Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory
and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal
Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 802 (2006).
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A second potential objection to reason-giving as a form of
accountability stems from the possibility that the implementation of deliberative democracy could reinforce existing societal
inequalities based on its relatively exclusive nature.133 Because
only a small percentage of public officials and engaged citizens
or interest groups will personally deliberate about politics or
even become aware of the reasoning that is provided by authoritative decision-makers or other activists, the interests and
perspectives of the inattentive public could potentially be systematically ignored. This concern is heightened by the fact that
actual political knowledge and participation is distributed unequally in our society, and media coverage and other sources of
political information are similarly skewed in favor of the wellorganized and socially advantaged.134 In other words, the concern is that deliberative accountability is inherently elitist in
nature and that excessive reliance upon it could therefore either be detrimental to socially marginalized individuals and
groups or unsympathetic to the majority’s preferences.
Although simultaneously avoiding both majority and minority faction is undoubtedly tricky, reliance upon reasoned deliberation is apt to fare better than political accountability in
this regard. The prevailing paradigm of political accountability
is premised upon a pluralist understanding of politics in which
the role of public officials is merely to aggregate and implement
the preferences of their constituents. If this system worked
properly, the interests of discrete and insular minorities would
systematically be ignored, at least in the absence of some countermajoritarian corrective.135 To the extent that the members of
such groups lack political knowledge and fail to participate in
the process, this problem is severely exacerbated. It is therefore
fairly obvious to see how unmediated popular decision making
could lead to the tyranny of the majority. Conversely, if a ma133. See, e.g., Gargarella, supra note 123, at 269–74 (identifying the difficulties associated with achieving “full representation” in contemporary societies, and concluding that proposals for improving “the impartiality of the decision-making process just by improving its deliberative character” are
implausible “if most people are kept at the margins of political deliberation”).
134. See Eule, supra note 41, at 1514–15 (“Citizens of higher social and
economic status are far more heavily represented among [American] voters
than among those who abstain, a class skew virtually unparalleled in any other political system conducting free elections.”); Somin, supra note 4, at 1354–
64 (describing “large intergroup differences in political knowledge . . . in the
United States today”).
135. For a classic defense of judicial review that is based on the need to
reinforce the representation of these interests, see ELY, supra note 22.
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jority of citizens lack political knowledge and fail to participate
effectively, the pluralist political process could be captured by
narrow special interests with disproportionate influence over
public officials.136 Because political participation and knowledge is distributed unequally in our society, an unregulated
pluralist political process is, in fact, likely to lead to majoritarian tyranny on some issues and special interest domination of
others—the worst of both worlds from an institutional design
perspective.
Discrete and insular minorities and unorganized general
interests are both better situated to prevail in a system that
values reason-giving because deliberative accountability privileges persuasive ideas over political power.137 A political system
of this nature treats each distinct interest and perspective with
equal respect by taking them fully into account in formulating
a decision. Because the prevailing policy choices should be
based on the best available options under the circumstances,
the specific sources of competing proposals and their respective
popularity should not ordinarily be determinative. This does
not mean, however, that such considerations are completely irrelevant. For example, public officials should give due regard to
the input of anyone with relevant expertise.138 Moreover, it
may be appropriate for public officials to consider the intensity
of preferences and provide extra weight to the interests of those
who will be most greatly affected by a particular decision.139
136. This is one of the central lessons of public choice theory. See MANCUR
OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1971).
137. See, e.g., GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at 132–34 (“To the extent that the political struggle takes place on the basis of deliberation rather
than of power, it is more evenly matched.”); see also Cohen, supra note 103, at
21–22 (claiming that political power can be justified “if and only if [a decision]
could be the object of a free and reasoned agreement among equals”); Christopher H. Schroeder, Deliberative Democracy’s Attempt to Turn Politics into
Law, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 95, 100–01 (2002) (explaining that under
deliberative democratic theory, “[u]ses of political power should be choicesensitive and status insensitive”).
138. See Mathew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez, When Does Deliberating Improve Decisionmaking?, 15 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 9, 35–39
(2006) (advocating “expertise systems” as “an effective way to improve social
welfare” and claiming that even though such systems “are not consistent with
many views of deliberation, where equality among participants is a key feature . . . many scholars who advocate deliberation actually recommend some
form of an expertise system”).
139. See Fearon, supra note 97, at 45–46 (explaining that discussion “allows people to express diverse intensities of preferences” and that the “relatively nuanced revelation of private information” that is facilitated by deliberation may influence voting decisions).
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The apparent preferences of a majority might otherwise play a
tie-breaking function in the absence of any need for structural
safeguards to protect minority interests.140 The crux of the matter is that unlike in a pluralist system, the inattentive public
does not need to be equally represented in either numbers or
power in order to protect their interests in a deliberative democracy, as long as their voices can be heard and they have
something significant to say.
This does not mean that existing inequalities in political
knowledge and participation are entirely unproblematic. On
the contrary, the inability or failure of some individuals or
groups to acquire available information and participate in the
political process makes it more difficult for them to ensure that
their interests and perspectives will be addressed. Moreover,
the relative silence of some constituents may lead public officials to ignore their most pressing concerns or underestimate
the intensity of their preferences or the degree of various sentiments on issues that do make the political agenda. Finally,
the exclusion of the vast majority of the general public from the
political dialogue is bound to hamper the quality of public deliberations by limiting the number of resources that are devoted
to our collective problems, even if each major perspective or interest is represented. Accordingly, it would clearly be beneficial
if existing disparities in political knowledge and participation
were eliminated, as well as if the depth and quality of the information about public affairs that is provided by educational
institutions and the media were substantially improved. Nonetheless, the goal of ensuring that public officials are deliberatively accountable for their actions can be achieved if they provide reasoned explanations for their policy decisions and a
sufficiently diverse range of perspectives is adequately engaged
to inform, evaluate, and potentially contest them. This particular standard could be met even if the vast majority of the electorate remained uninformed about politics or otherwise behaved in a less than virtuous fashion.141
140. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at 141–42 (describing the
circumstances in which “the deliberative principle of accountability justifies or
allows deference to popular opinion”); Cohen, supra note 92, at 197 (“[W]hen
people do appeal to considerations that are quite generally recognized as having considerable weight, then the fact that a proposal has majority support
will itself commonly count as a reason for endorsing it.”).
141. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at 132–33 (“Disadvantaged
groups have usually found representatives from within their own ranks who
could speak for them, and who could articulate their interests and ideals, at
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A third potential objection to deliberative accountability
stems from its relative indifference to the electorate’s potential
capacity to sanction public officials who make inappropriate decisions.142 As previously explained, however, electoral sanctions
are sometimes unavailable for public officials, like the President, who are routinely considered politically accountable.143
Moreover, some public officials who should be expected to give
reasoned explanations for their decisions are subject to periodic
elections. The fact that political accountability is much weaker
than conventional theories of public law maintain does not
mean that elections are irrelevant or unnecessary in a democracy.144 In an ideal world, the reasons that public officials provide (or fail to provide) for their decisions would strongly influence voting decisions.145 A public official’s susceptibility to
periodic elections should therefore be one relevant factor in defining her institutional responsibilities, even if modern public
law theory dramatically overstates its importance.146
In any event, removing a public official from office pursuant to an election is not the only available sanction for illegitimate or unpopular decisions. For example, unelected agency
heads and federal judges are potentially subject to removal
from office or impeachment for some misbehavior.147 Of greater
relevance for deliberative accountability, reason-giving imposes
a meaningful form of self-discipline upon the public officials
least as reasonably and effectively as representatives of established groups.”).
142. See Rubin, supra note 1, at 2073 (defining accountability as “the ability of one actor to demand an explanation or justification of another actor for
its actions and to reward or punish that second actor on the basis of its performance or its explanation”); supra notes 64–67 and accompanying text (describing this aspect of the political accountability paradigm).
143. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text.
145. Cf. Rawls, supra note 92, at 769 (“When firm and widespread, the disposition of citizens to view themselves as ideal legislators, and to repudiate
government officials and candidates for public office who violate public reason,
is one of the political and social roots of democracy, and is vital to its enduring
strength and vigor.”). For a recent reminder that we do not live in this ideal
world, see DREW WESTEN, THE POLITICAL BRAIN (2007) (describing the dominant role of emotion in processing political information).
146. See infra Part IV; see also GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at
146 (“To defend deliberative accountability, we do not have to deny that representatives should attend to the claims of those who elect them.”).
147. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (providing that federal judges “shall hold
their Offices during good Behaviour”); United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483,
484 (1886) (recognizing the power of removal that is incident to the President’s
power of appointment under the Constitution).
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who are subject to this particular requirement or expectation.148 Reason-giving also subjects public officials to more fully
informed public oversight and criticism.149 It may also provide
a crucial basis for a legal challenge to the validity of the underlying decision.150 And regardless of the outcome of judicial review, most of the specific policy decisions by public officials are
open to subsequent challenge on the merits in the political
process.151 Although most of the available avenues for responding to the decisions of public officials are pursued by other public officials and elites rather than by ordinary citizens, the critics of earlier policy choices should also be expected to provide
reasoned explanations of their own to mount a successful challenge to the prevailing status quo. Accordingly, the sanctions
that are available to challenge the merits of governmental action will continue to promote even further deliberative accountability.
IV. ENHANCING THE FOCUS ON DELIBERATIVE
ACCOUNTABILITY IN MODERN PUBLIC LAW
The foregoing observations do not mean that elections are
meaningless or unnecessary in a democracy. Rather, as explained at the outset of this Article, periodic elections do per148. See Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of “Hard
Look” Judicial Review, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 753, 761–63 (2006) (“Defenders of
hard look review, including the courts that employ it, argue that it ensures the
supposedly expert agency really has based its decision on a reasoned analysis
of relevant information.”). As Stephenson explains, critics of hard-look judicial
review vigorously dispute its purported benefits and whether they are worth
the costs. See id. at 763–65. For a discussion of similar issues that are raised
about the purported benefits of written judicial opinions, see Chad M. Oldfather, Writing, Cognition, and the Nature of the Judicial Function, 96 GEO. L.J.
1283 (2008).
149. See supra text accompanying note 100.
150. For example, federal administrative decisions will be invalidated as
arbitrary or capricious under the APA if an agency:
has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider,
entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered
an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a
difference in view or the product of agency expertise.
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
43 (1983).
151. See infra note 188 and accompanying text. Because the judiciary has
neither the power of the purse nor the sword, political officials can also conceivably refuse to enforce or follow their decisions. See Friedman, Dialogue,
supra note 21, at 643–48 (challenging the assumption that a judicial decision
constitutes the last word on an issue).
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form some vital functions, including holding public officials politically accountable in a very general way.152 They do not
guarantee, however, that elected officials are politically accountable in a meaningful way for their specific policy decisions. If
we really want to promote the legitimacy of government authority and avoid arbitrary decisions, we need to think about
democratic accountability in different and more sophisticated
ways.
This Part argues that the political accountability paradigm
that dominates American public law should be discarded in favor of an enhanced focus on deliberative accountability. It
proceeds to explain that this course of action would have significant implications for the proper conception of the structure of
American democracy, which would help to resolve some of the
most contested issues in the fields of constitutional theory, administrative law, and legislation. Finally, it points out that a
paradigm shift of this nature would have tangible implications
for certain individual rights, which are illustrated by the controversy over the appropriate legal treatment of same-sex marriage.
A. THE NEED FOR A PARADIGM SHIFT IN MODERN PUBLIC LAW
This Article has explained that the prevailing paradigm of
democratic accountability is implausible because public officials
are not held politically accountable for their specific policy decisions by periodic elections. It has also claimed that public officials can be held deliberatively accountable by a requirement or
expectation that they give reasoned explanations for their policy decisions that could reasonably be accepted by free and
equal citizens with different interests and perspectives. Because public law theory and doctrine should be consistent with
reality or, at a minimum, based on legal fictions that improve
the workings of democracy,153 this section claims that we
should discard the political accountability paradigm as a basis
for legitimizing specific policy decisions in favor of an enhanced
focus on deliberative accountability.
152. See supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text.
153. For a discussion of the use of these techniques in statutory interpretation, see Schacter, supra note 30, at 593 (identifying a new conception of democratic legitimacy in statutory interpretation whereby the court assigns meaning to a contested statutory term by using interpretive rules that are designed
to produce “democratizing effects” that correspond to a particular image of
democracy).
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The Article has already established that the political accountability paradigm does not comport with reality. Moreover,
it seems unlikely that this will ever be the case without unattainable increases in political knowledge and participation.154
The only remaining question, then, is whether the fiction of political accountability serves a valuable function in public law
theory and doctrine. Although it is worthwhile to remind unelected officials that they should ordinarily defer to the clear
policy choices of elected representatives, this particular message can be sent in better ways. The same is true of the idea
that public officials should duly respect the ascertainable preferences of the majority. Because “political accountability” is otherwise nothing more than empty rhetoric that can be used by
one side or the other at all times and in all cases, the existing
paradigm appears on balance to be a liability. This is especially
true when arbitrary or otherwise unjustified decisions are privileged solely because they were made pursuant to direct democracy or by elected officials who could theoretically be held
accountable by the voters at the next election.
The fundamental problem with the fiction of political accountability is that it does not contain a coherent stopping
point—it tells unelected officials that they must always defer to
the policy choices of elected representatives and the majoritarian preferences they embody. Meanwhile, however, the ideal of
political accountability is moderated in our federal system by
separated powers and checks and balances that necessarily limit the extent to which governmental policies will reflect the will
of the majority.155 Elected representatives may depart from the
wishes of their constituents, and overcoming the hurdles of bicameralism and presentment requires a supermajority.156
Moreover, the power of judicial review can lead to the invalidation of statutes that have surmounted the hurdles of the legislative process.157 Because these structural safeguards are designed to protect individuals and political minorities from the

154. See Somin, supra note 4, at 1325 (arguing that there is a small payoff
to an individual for acquiring political knowledge, and as a result, political ignorance is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future).
155. See, e.g., Eule, supra note 41, at 1522–31 (providing an influential discussion of the republican safeguards against majority faction that are provided
by the Constitution); Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 95, at 31–49
(same).
156. See Manning, supra note 34, at 74–78.
157. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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tyranny of the majority,158 they inherently conflict with the political accountability paradigm and present an insoluble countermajoritarian difficulty.159 At the end of the day, the political
accountability paradigm that currently dominates public law
theory and doctrine is both completely unrealistic and incompatible with existing democratic institutions.
Although it is difficult to say how often public officials provide reasoned explanations for their decisions that could reasonably be accepted by free and equal persons with different interests and perspectives, it seems plausible to believe that
deliberative accountability is at least as prevalent as political
accountability as an empirical matter in the modern regulatory
state.160 Moreover, deliberative accountability is selfconsciously aspirational in nature,161 whereas political accountability is often falsely presumed to exist by modern public law
theory. The fact that deliberative accountability and political
accountability both fall short of their ideal levels therefore poses far more difficulties for the latter theory.162 As explained
above, political accountability is routinely presumed to be selfenforcing, and correcting its deficiencies would require unattainable increases in existing levels of political knowledge and
participation.163 Conversely, outside enforcement mechanisms
and structural safeguards already exist and can be further
reinforced to facilitate greater levels of deliberative accountability in the modern regulatory state.164 Reason-giving therefore offers a far more promising route for ensuring that public
officials who exercise discretionary authority can be held accountable for their decisions.
Interestingly, if reason-giving is viewed as the relevant
mechanism of democratic accountability, the existing hierarchy
of perceived institutional competence in modern public law
158. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
159. See Rebecca L. Brown, Liberty, the New Equality, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1491, 1494 (2002) (“[C]laims of liberty are often understood as assertions of
‘trumps’ against majority decisions and thus in tension with democratic
rule.”).
160. See infra notes 165–170 and accompanying text.
161. See, e.g., GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at 357 (acknowledging
that deliberative democracy’s “highest ideals make demands that actual politics may never fulfill”).
162. See id. (“The gap between the theory and practice of deliberative democracy is narrower than in most other conceptions of democracy.”).
163. See supra note 154 and accompanying text; supra Part I.
164. See infra notes 165–70 and accompanying text; infra Part IV.B.
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would be completely reversed. The independent judiciary is
routinely expected to provide reasoned explanations for its decisions.165 Moreover, federal administrative agencies are subject to procedural safeguards, including hard-look judicial review, that often compel them to provide reasoned explanations
for their decisions as well.166 The judiciary does not ordinarily
impose a meaningful reasoned decision-making requirement
upon the legislature,167 but the successful enactment of a statute pursuant to the constitutional requirements of bicameralism and presentment ordinarily requires lawmakers to engage
in reasoned deliberation with their colleagues.168 There are no
comparable structural safeguards that consistently require the
President to give reasoned explanations for his decisions,169 but
congressional oversight and modern media coverage may provide some selective opportunities for his policy decisions to be

165. See, e.g., John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason, in DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY 93, 108–14 (James Bohman & William Rehg eds., 1997) (characterizing the Supreme Court as the “exemplar” of the type of “public reason”
that should govern the public arena); see also Oldfather, supra note 148, at
1285 (recognizing “longstanding conceptions of the judicial role, in which reasoned analysis stands as the core feature of legitimate judging”); Louis Michael Seidman, Ambivalence and Accountability, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1571, 1574
(1988) (recognizing that appellate judges are usually accountable in the sense
that they give reasons or justifications for their decisions).
166. See Staszewski, supra note 38, at 443–46 (“The net result of APA procedures and ‘hard-look’ judicial review under State Farm is to encourage and
enforce republican ideals of deliberation and reasoned decisionmaking in the
administrative lawmaking process.”); Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 95,
at 56–58 (describing administrative law doctrine as “classically republican”
because of its requirements of “deliberation” and “reasoned analysis”).
167. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322 (1980) (recognizing the
“presumption of constitutional validity” that is ordinarily attributed to acts of
Congress); Phillip P. Frickey, The Communion of Strangers: Representative
Government, Direct Democracy, and the Privatization of the Public Sphere, 34
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 421, 444 (1998) (“Federal constitutional law conclusively
presumes that, when general legislation affects many people, the legislative
process” meets the criteria of due process of lawmaking because it “develop[s]
the relevant facts and legal standards so that people are not deprived of important rights or interests based on erroneous assumptions” and promotes
“participation and dialogue by affected individuals in the decisionmaking
process”).
168. See Staszewski, supra note 91, at 1018–22 (describing the reasoned
deliberation that is facilitated in the legislative process by the constitutional
safeguards of representation and bicameralism and presentment).
169. The Constitution, however, requires the President to report periodically on “the state of the union” and to provide the reasons for his objections to a
bill that was presented to him by Congress if he returns the proposal to the
legislature without his signature. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2; art. II, § 3.
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subject to deliberative accountability.170 For the most part,
however, neither the voters nor the initiative proponents are
required or expected to provide reasoned explanations for their
particular decisions during the ballot initiative process.171
In any event, an enhanced focus on deliberative accountability would avoid the internal contradictions of the existing
paradigm because the structural safeguards of the lawmaking
process can all be understood to facilitate reasoned deliberation, in addition to protecting individual rights and political
minorities.172 Representation and bicameralism and presentment therefore play a coherent moderating role for the ideal of
deliberative accountability. Specifically, their existence provides a legitimate reason for one institution to defer to choices
made by other institutions even when officials in the former institution would not otherwise have chosen a specific course of
action.173 This explains why an emphasis on deliberative accountability does not mean that courts and agencies should be
the primary policy makers in a republican democracy.
As indicated above, courts and agencies may very well do
the best job of providing reasoned explanations for their decisions on a regular basis. Nonetheless, when elected representatives of the people successfully enact a law pursuant to the
Constitution’s single, finely wrought, and exhaustively considered process of lawmaking, the resulting product is entitled to
respect based on this pedigree.174 Elected officials do, moreover,
170. See, e.g., Michael A. Fitts, The Paradox of Power in the Modern State:
Why a Unitary, Centralized Presidency May Not Exhibit Effective or Legitimate
Leadership, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 827, 843–45 (1996) (describing the “rhetorical
functions” performed by the modern presidency through its “public media
role”).
171. See Staszewski, supra note 38, at 398 (recognizing that direct democracy allows unelected citizens to make laws without structural safeguards that
“are designed to encourage careful deliberation and reasoned decisionmaking
in the legislative process”); Staszewski, supra note 88, at 32–39 (claiming that
the initiative process facilitates deceptive behavior by initiative proponents
and increases the risk that successful ballot measures will have collateral consequences not intended by the voters).
172. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
173. See Eule, supra note 41, at 1532 (recognizing that a successfully
enacted statute necessarily “passed through an extensive filtering system,”
characterizing the results of this process as “majoritarianism plus,” and claiming that “[i]t is the plus that reflects the Framers’ unique vision of democracy,
and it is the plus that warrants judicial caution in substituting its own judgment”); supra notes 167–68 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 173; see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951, 959
(1983) (holding that the legislative veto violates the constitutional require-
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have some significant deliberative advantages over courts
based on their access to a broader range of information and
perspectives and their ability to engage in logrolling and to set
their own agendas.175 Unruly as the legislative process may be,
it is typically appropriate for courts to presume that ordinary
legislation is constitutionally valid and to follow a version of
legislative supremacy in statutory interpretation. The basis for
this respect is not, however, that legislation reflects the will of
the majority and voters will hold elected representatives accountable if it does not, but rather that a statute has ordinarily
emerged from a deliberative process that requires broad
agreement on ways of promoting the public good.176
The same rationale explains why administrative agencies
are obligated to follow legislative intent when Congress has explicitly resolved a particular issue.177 Moreover, similar considerations explain why courts should often defer to the policy
choices of agencies when this is not the case.178 That said, there
is no reason to think that the structural safeguards of lawmaking are infallible. For example, statutes and regulations might
infringe the constitutional rights of individuals or minority
ments of bicameralism and presentment, and explaining that the Framers decided that “the legislative power of the Federal government [could only] be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered,
procedure”).
175. See, e.g., Eule, supra note 41, at 1556 (“Legislative logrolling over a
broad agenda brings minorities into the process and allows resulting compromises to accommodate their interests.”); Marci A. Hamilton, Representation
and Nondelegation: Back to Basics, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 807, 814 (1999) (explaining that “[b]ecause of its numbers, Congress is capable of mediating a
great variety of interests” and “[a]s a result, it is capable of reaching more
nuanced compromises on national issues. . . . to reach the public good”).
176. See Eule, supra note 41, at 1532 (recognizing that “[t]he ‘difficulty’
with judicial review entails its reconciliation with the constitutional version of
democracy, not with some abstract form that exalts unfiltered majoritarianism” and claiming that the countermajoritarian difficulty “would be more accurately conceptualized as a ‘counter-representative’ or ‘counter-republican’
difficulty”); see also Sunstein, Republican Revival, supra note 95, at 1550
(“The requirement of deliberation is designed to ensure that political outcomes
will be supported by reference to a consensus (or at least broad agreement)
among political equals.”).
177. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842–43 (1984).
178. See Robert A. Anthony & David A. Codevilla, Pro-Ossification: A
Harder Look at Agency Policy Statements, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 667, 677
(1996) (“[T]he deference that courts extend to legislative rules reflects an assumption that, because due opportunities for comment and deliberation have
occurred, the product is worthy of judicial respect.”); supra note 166 and accompanying text.
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groups or pose unanticipated problems when they are subsequently applied to unforeseen circumstances. Agencies may
simply bow to political pressure rather than engage in reasoned
decision making. In light of these dangers, the judiciary is in a
good position to oversee the implementation of public law and
to serve a legitimate checking function by reviewing the decisions of the political branches. Instead of viewing judicial review as a countermajoritarian force in an otherwise majoritarian system, this conception of the judicial role recognizes that
the true reasons for deference to political institutions can run
out, thereby reinvigorating the need for meaningful deliberative accountability.179 From this perspective, the angst that
public law scholars have plainly felt about the need to legitimize the role of courts and agencies in our democracy would be
better directed toward the shortcomings of deliberative accountability in the political branches of our government. From
“earmarks” to omnibus legislation to stonewalling by executive
branch officers, we need to find ways to encourage or require
elected officials to give transparent, public-regarding reasons
for their policy choices on a more regular basis.180
In sum, the deliberative accountability paradigm is more
realistic and internally coherent than the political accountability paradigm that currently dominates public law theory and
doctrine. The deliberative accountability paradigm is also more
normatively attractive. Consistent with our constitutional traditions, it recognizes the legitimacy of setting appropriate lim179. See, e.g., Lawrence Gene Sager, Insular Majorities Unabated: Warth v.
Seldin and City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 91 HARV. L. REV.
1373, 1411–12 (1978) (recognizing that judicial deference is often justified on
the grounds “that the governmental body which has enacted a regulatory
measure is best equipped to make judgments of policy and strategy, and further, that the body in question can and will measure its own conduct against
constitutional requirements” and claiming that “judicial departures from the
tradition of deference are often justified by circumstances which impair or
render suspect this process of legislative deliberation”).
180. The articulation and defense of specific reform proposals of this nature
are beyond the scope of this Article. Heightened standards of judicial review
for “due process of lawmaking” are one potential option, but it would certainly
be preferable to find “political solutions” for these accountability deficits if at
all possible. Cf. Brown, supra note 106, at 37 (recognizing that the “frightening
specter” of imposing “substantive obligations [on] legislatures” has never
“gained much purchase in American constitutional law” and that this is unlikely to change); Frickey & Smith, supra note 50, at 1707–09 (claiming that
an accurate understanding of congressional decision-making processes suggests that Congress cannot satisfy a judicially imposed requirement of due deliberation and rational, articulated decision-making).
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its on majority rule without ignoring the value of public opinion. At the same time that it holds public officials accountable
for their policy decisions, the deliberative accountability paradigm also respects other fundamental democratic values, including liberty, equality, and First Amendment guarantees, regardless of the pre-political preferences of a majority. The fact
that protecting these values is often considered undemocratic
under the existing paradigm ought to strike us as the real difficulty of democratic theory in the modern regulatory state.181
For all of these reasons, the political accountability paradigm
that dominates American public law should be discarded as a
basis for legitimizing specific policy decisions in favor of an enhanced focus on deliberative accountability. The remainder of
the Article explains some of the specific implications of this vision of democracy.
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN PUBLIC
LAW
The adoption of a new paradigm of democratic accountability would not necessarily require a dramatic overhaul of existing institutional arrangements in the American regulatory
state, but an enhanced focus on deliberative accountability
would have significant implications for some of the most vigorously contested issues in modern public law theory and doctrine. First, we could finally move beyond the countermajoritarian difficulty in constitutional law by recognizing that judicial
review does not substitute the preferences of an unaccountable
judiciary for those of an accountable legislature. The judiciary
and the legislature are both accountable in different ways, and
at least when it comes to adjudicating cases or controversies
that involve alleged violations of individual rights and the enforcement of limitations on governmental authority, there are
compelling reasons to prefer the type of accountability that is
attributable to an independent judiciary that gives reasoned
explanations for its decisions.182 Moving beyond the counterma181. For a theory that treats constitutional principles of liberty, equality,
and citizenship as central to democracy, see Jane S. Schacter, Romer v. Evans
and Democracy’s Domain, 50 VAND. L. REV. 361, 399 (1997).
182. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 16, at 102 (claiming that “society
should have an institution . . . that is not popularly elected or directly electorally accountable identify and protect values that are sufficiently important to
be constitutionalized and safeguarded from political majorities” and that “Justices should openly explain and defend their value choices, and thus persuade
observers of the best way to understand and apply the Constitution”).
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joritarian difficulty would allow constitutional theorists to stop
worrying about the legitimacy of judicial review and focus instead on how it should be conducted.
Second, instead of viewing the separation of powers as a
formal commitment to a strict separation of functions or a functional effort to maintain a proper balance of power among the
original three branches,183 we should envision the entire public
law system as what John Braithwaite has called “a checking
and balancing circle of deliberative circles.”184

Thus, (1) statutes may be enacted to address social problems pursuant to the requirements of bicameralism and presentment;185 (2) administrative agencies implement their dele183. For a compelling argument that the conventional mechanisms for
maintaining the separation of powers in American government are incoherent
and unhelpful, see M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 603 (2001).
184. John Braithwaite, Accountability and Responsibility Through Restorative Justice, in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 11, at 33, 39–40 (comparing the republican vision of separated powers with a more hierarchical vision).
185. See Staszewski, supra note 91, at 1026 (setting forth an understanding of the legislative process whereby “statutes should have an instrumental
purpose that promotes the common good”).
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gated authority pursuant to the applicable procedures (with the
potential influence and oversight of the President and members
of Congress);186 (3) final agency action is subject to judicial review for compliance with the governing law and reasoned decision making;187 and (4) a subsequent Congress and President
can overrule earlier legislative decisions and most of the choices of agencies and the judiciary.188 Not only are policy decisions
made at each stage of this process subject to ongoing review
and refinement by officials in other institutions, but each stage
of the process is designed in a deliberative fashion.189 The goal,
then, can be understood as facilitating both the checking that is
provided by multiple institutions, as well as the deliberation
that is conducted within each of them, to legitimize and improve public policy and minimize the likelihood that private
parties will be adversely affected by arbitrary governmental action.
From this perspective, the adoption of a strong version of
the theory of the unitary executive would clearly be a mistake.
This theory relies upon a formal separation of governmental
functions that narrowly defines the legislative and judicial
roles and leaves a substantial range of policy-making authority
to the Chief Executive.190 The theory also strictly limits the extent to which the legislature and judiciary can legitimately
check the executive’s activities through congressional oversight
or judicial review.191 The result would be that the executive
branch could do virtually whatever it wanted in the vast range
186. For interesting discussions of the role of administrative procedures in
enabling legislative oversight and public-interested regulation, see Lisa
Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM.
L. REV. 1749 (2007), and Steven P. Croley, Public Interested Regulation, 28
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 7 (2000).
187. See Abbot Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967) (establishing a
presumption in favor of judicial review of final agency action).
188. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991) (conducting an empirical
study and analysis of the extent to which Congress overrules statutory decisions of the Supreme Court).
189. See supra notes 165–68 and accompanying text.
190. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697–98, 704–12 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential
Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 896–97
(1983) (arguing that the judiciary should not interfere with the operation of
the political branches except to protect vested individual rights).
191. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 25, at 50–57 (claiming that congressional oversight and judicial review threaten the President’s ability to faithfully execute the laws).
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of circumstances in which it executed the law. Because the political accountability that purportedly justifies this arrangement is weak, and the most readily available mechanisms for
securing deliberative accountability would be eliminated, the
President would, in effect, be able to do whatever he wanted.
Not only would this result be as far removed as possible from a
checking and balancing circle of deliberative circles (more like
an omnipotent dot), but it would also provide a perfect recipe
for arbitrary governmental action.
Third, an enhanced focus on deliberative accountability
would have clear implications for the most pressing debates in
contemporary administrative law. Specifically, executivebranch agencies should continue to be required to give reasoned
explanations for their policy decisions that are subject to meaningful judicial review, even when those decisions are made at
the behest of the President. While deference is appropriate
when agencies with expertise reach their decisions by a sufficiently deliberative process, the judiciary should continue to
ensure that an administrative agency’s exercise of delegated
authority is supported by reasoned explanations. This means
that (1) hard-look judicial review should continue to govern discretionary policy choices;192 (2) the second step of Chevron
should largely replicate this analysis and therefore turn on
whether the agency engaged in reasoned decision making;193 (3)
the procedural safeguards that precede an agency’s interpretive
decisions should have a bearing on whether it is entitled to deference under the Chevron framework;194 (4) prior judicial in192. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (adopting the hard-look standard of judicial review); see also Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking,
75 TEX. L. REV. 483, 484–90 (1997) (claiming that the undesirable effects of
hard-look judicial review are likely outweighed by its considerable benefits,
which include “the need to ensure that agencies act not only within acceptable
legal and political bounds, but also exercise their discretion in a deliberative
manner”).
193. See Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253, 1254–55, 1263–77 (1997) (endorsing this
approach and finding evidence of its use by the D.C. Circuit); Mark Seidenfeld,
A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing
Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83, 83 (1994)
(“[D]eliberative democracy suggests a modification of Chevron which would
place the emphasis on the second rather than the first Chevron step, thereby
forcing agencies to explain why their interpretations are good policy in light of
the purposes and concerns underlying the statutory scheme.”).
194. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) (holding
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terpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions should not
trump well-reasoned agency decisions to the contrary under
Chevron;195 and (5) the modern Skidmore standard that applies
in most other circumstances sensibly requires the judiciary to
evaluate the quality and degree of an agency’s deliberative accountability in assessing how much respect should be accorded
to its interpretive decisions.196 Most fundamentally, legislative
delegations of authority to executive agencies should be understood as providing final decision-making authority to agency
officials, rather than to the President, based on their superior
deliberative accountability in the vast majority of circumstances.197
Although the foregoing conclusions are basically consistent
with existing judicial precedent,198 the current regulatory
process and administrative law doctrines are by no means perfect. For example, the APA’s exemptions from notice-andthat an agency interpretation “qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears
that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was
promulgated in the exercise of that authority”); id. at 227 (explaining that the
foregoing standard will generally be met when an agency interpretation is
rendered pursuant to formal adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking);
see also Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (denying Chevron deference to an agency interpretation rendered in an opinion letter).
195. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545
U.S. 967, 982–83 (2005) (holding that a prior judicial construction only trumps
an agency’s interpretation under Chevron if the court held that its construction was mandated by the unambiguous terms of the statute and explaining
that a contrary rule would unnecessarily “preclud[e] agencies from revising
unwise judicial constructions of ambiguous statutes”).
196. The “Skidmore factors,” which are perhaps taking on increased practical significance, provide a nice laundry-list of what it takes to achieve deliberative accountability: (1) thorough consideration; (2) participatory and deliberative procedures; (3) the application of expertise; (4) valid reasoning; and
(5) consistent treatment of regulated parties (with reasoned explanations for
any changes in the regulatory course). Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134,
140 (1944). For an informative description of the judiciary’s application of
these factors, see Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the
“Modern” Skidmore Standard, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1235 (2007).
197. But cf. Kagan, supra note 25, at 2251, 2326–31 (“[A] statutory delegation to an executive agency official . . . usually should be read as allowing the
President to assert directive authority . . . over the exercise of the delegated
discretion.”).
198. It bears noting, however, that the current status of hard-look judicial
review and its relationship to the second step of the Chevron analysis is not
entirely clear. See Michael Herz, The Rehnquist Court and Administrative
Law, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 297, 308–25 (2004). The degree of respect that should
be accorded to agency interpretations under Skidmore is also still in a great
deal of flux. See Hickman & Krueger, supra note 196, at 1237.
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comment rulemaking are arguably too broad because several of
the exempted categories of decision making would substantially
benefit from public deliberation.199 Judicial decisions that limit
the standing of regulatory beneficiaries to challenge the validity of agency action are also problematic because they remove
an important incentive for agencies (as well as courts) to give
sufficient consideration to a crucial perspective in the formulation of public policy.200 In addition to concerns about the disparate treatment of similarly situated parties, the presumption
against judicial review of non-enforcement decisions is also
problematic for essentially the same reasons.201 The potential
advantages of regulated entities over regulatory beneficiaries
in an unregulated administrative process and related forms of
arbitrary decision making are likely to be exacerbated (and deliberative accountability undermined) by the absence of restrictions on ex parte contacts in informal rulemaking.202 On a
much broader level, although White House coordination and
review of regulatory policy making can be beneficial in various
ways, there is a real need to consider the extent to which safeguards can feasibly be provided to prevent similar abuses of
this power.203 There are no easy solutions to the foregoing prob199. See Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency
Policymaking, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 402–03 (2007) (claiming that the case
for procedural reform of informal agency policymaking is significantly bolstered by a recognition of the need for adequate consideration of the interests
and perspectives of regulatory beneficiaries).
200. For a prominent example of a decision that restricts the standing of
regulatory beneficiaries to seek judicial review, see Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). For critical commentary, see Lisa Schultz Bressman,
Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1657, 1692 (2004) (claiming that the Court’s standing doctrine facilitates
faction by giving regulated entities more power to challenge agency action
than regulatory beneficiaries and thereby making it “more likely that agencies
will respond to private or political pressure rather than public welfare”); Cass
R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 186–88, 195–96 (1992) (criticizing the Court for
disfavoring regulatory beneficiaries in this context).
201. See Bressman, supra note 200, at 1692 (explaining that the nonreviewability doctrine has the same negative impact as limitations on the standing
of regulatory beneficiaries); supra note 44.
202. Compare Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 400–02 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(holding that ex parte contacts between an agency and interested parties did
not violate the governing statute or the informal rulemaking procedures of the
APA), with Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 51–59 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(invalidating regulations promulgated by an agency on the basis of undisclosed ex parte contacts).
203. See, e.g., William D. Araiza, Judicial and Legislative Checks on Ex
Parte OMB Influence Over Rulemaking, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 611, 615 (2002)
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lems that could be fully articulated here, but recognition of the
weaknesses of the political accountability of the President and
the potential significance of a requirement or expectation that
public officials give reasoned explanations for their policy decisions helps to explain why we should care.
Fourth, an enhanced focus on deliberative accountability
would have significant implications for the appropriate methodologies of statutory interpretation in other contexts. Virtually
everyone agrees that the plain meaning of a statutory text
should control when there is no constitutional difficulty and
Congress explicitly resolved the relevant issue in the legislative
process.204 Most commentators also agree that identifiable legislative bargains should be enforced by the judiciary in the absence of significant constitutional difficulties.205 The advocates
of competing interpretive methodologies tend to part ways,
however, when it comes to resolving the seemingly unanticipated problems that could otherwise arise when a law is applied to particular circumstances.206 They also tend to disagree
about when statutory ambiguity exists, and which potential
sources of meaning should be used to resolve it.207
(suggesting that external checks would be useful “to guard against potentially
inappropriate . . . influence over the rulemaking process”); Sidney A. Shapiro,
Two Cheers for HBO: The Problem of the Nonpublic Record, 54 ADMIN. L. REV.
853, 855 (2002) (arguing that “agencies and the White House should reveal
private communications of central relevance” to rulemaking proceedings).
204. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings
of the “Judicial Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990,
1090–91 (2001).
205. See Molot, supra note 36, at 31 (explaining that central tenets of texualism have resonated with mainstream judges and scholars “who generally
accept that courts should be faithful to legislative instructions and follow laws
enacted through bicameralism and presentment rather than make new laws
themselves”).
206. See Eskridge, supra note 204, at 1090–92 (claiming that the unwillingness to consider other contextual evidence when a judge discerns a plain
statutory meaning from textual sources is an innovation of strict texualism
“that represents a significant departure from the Court’s practice in the twentieth century, and is [in]consistent with the original understandings of Article
III”); Manning, supra note 34, at 20–27 (explaining that the contrast between
strong purposivism and textualism only comes into play when the statutory
text is unambiguous); Staszewski, supra note 91, at 1025–27 (explaining that
“theoretical differences between the new textualism and civic republican understandings of the legislative process and constitutional structure lead to
competing conceptions of the judicial role” when “legislative generality produces a problematic outcome that was unforeseen by the legislature”).
207. See Molot, supra note 36, at 36–39, 44–48 (analyzing the unresolved
areas of disagreement between “aggressive textualists” and the adherents of
other theories of statutory interpretation).

2009]

REASON-GIVING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

1309

Generally speaking, strict textualists believe that ambiguity only exists when at least two linguistically plausible meanings remain after thoroughly examining a statute’s semantic
context.208 When this occurs, courts may properly consider the
underlying statutory purpose and other policy considerations in
choosing from among linguistically permissible meanings, provided that they do not rely upon the legislative history to ascertain what the legislature intended to achieve when it enacted
the statute.209 The judiciary may, in turn, only exercise equitable discretion or avoid absurd results when a chosen interpretation reflects a linguistically permissible resolution of statutory ambiguity, or perhaps when such action is necessary to avoid
invalidating a statute on constitutional grounds.210 Courts
must otherwise adhere to the “plain meaning” of statutory language even when it leads to absurd results or other highly
problematic outcomes that were seemingly unanticipated by
Congress.211 Odd as it may seem, this is what it allegedly
means for courts to fulfill their constitutionally mandated role
as “faithful agents” of the legislature.212
An explicit motivation for textualism is a belief that policy
decisions should only be made by politically accountable officials and that the judiciary should refrain from altering the
balance of interests that is reflected by a statute or letting
lawmakers off the hook by fixing their mistakes.213 As explained above, the “political accountability” of lawmakers may
be a harmless fiction to the extent that it encourages the judiciary to respect Congress’s authority when it has explicitly re208. See Manning, supra note 33, at 2463 (claiming that statutory ambiguity only exists when “a given phrase has several relevant social connotations”);
see generally John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 70 (2006) (distinguishing textualism from purposivism on
the grounds that textualists emphasize semantic context over policy context
and vice versa).
209. See Manning, supra note 208, at 84–85 (“[W]hen a statute is ambiguous, textualists think it quite appropriate to resolve that ambiguity in light
of the statute’s apparent overall purpose.”).
210. See Manning, supra note 33, at 2462–63 (“For textualists, the prerequisite for employing a contextual interpretation to avoid absurdity is the existence of a relevant and established social nuance to the usage of the word or
phrase in context.” (emphasis omitted)); see also Manning, supra note 34, at
115–19 (discussing Justice Scalia’s efforts to limit the absurdity doctrine to
circumstances “in which the more natural textual meaning would pose serious
constitutional questions under the rational-basis test”).
211. See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text.
212. See id.
213. See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text.
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solved a policy question,214 but the idea that lawmakers are politically accountable for their specific policy decisions becomes
problematic when it is used as a justification to limit the judiciary’s interpretive authority over questions that were apparently never considered or consciously resolved in the legislative
process. In the latter circumstances, strict reliance on the plain
meaning of the statutory text will have a tendency to promote
random and potentially arbitrary outcomes because the range
of textually plausible meanings may itself be a function of happenstance. When a statute’s plain meaning is deemed unambiguous after an examination of its semantic context, the resulting interpretation will also be random and potentially arbitrary
to the extent that its policy consequences were never explicitly
considered by the legislature or the judiciary.215 This problem is
only exacerbated by a court’s refusal to consider a statute’s policy context when Congress was pursuing an identifiable goal.216
The new textualism therefore ultimately promotes arbitrary
outcomes and purports to limit the judiciary’s discretion in a
manner that would practically guarantee that there is no political or deliberative accountability for a substantial number of
policy decisions that profoundly affect people’s lives.217
The best way to avoid arbitrary governmental action and
promote democratic accountability in statutory interpretation
is to recognize that ambiguity exists whenever Congress does
not explicitly resolve a particular issue in the legislative

214. See supra text accompanying notes 154–55.
215. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 243–44 (2d ed. 2006) (explaining that textualism poses a risk
of “creating a law without mind” (internal quotations omitted)).
216. See Molot, supra note 36, at 54 (“Where judges refuse to consider statutory purposes, they make it that much harder for the people’s elected representatives to accomplish their goals.”).
217. The legislature’s subsequent opportunity to amend a statute to overrule the judiciary’s decision could result in valuable political deliberation
about the policy question at issue, but it would not ordinarily eliminate the
arbitrary judicial decision that was previously rendered. It therefore seems
preferable for the judiciary to render a reasoned decision in the first instance,
which still allows Congress to amend the statute to reach a different outcome
if it so chooses. Cf. W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 112–16
(1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (recognizing that Congress has the power to
correct the judiciary’s “mistakes” in statutory interpretation, but claiming that
“we do the country a disservice when we needlessly ignore persuasive evidence
of Congress’s actual purpose and require it ‘to take the time to revisit the matter’ and to restate its purpose in more precise English whenever its work
product suffers from an omission or inadvertent error” (citation omitted)).
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process.218 A sensible way to inform this threshold determination in a deliberative democracy is to examine what elected
representatives said in the legislative process when the statute
was enacted.219 When ambiguity is apparent from the face of a
statute or the problematic consequences that would otherwise
result from a seemingly unanticipated application of the law, a
court should consider whether the statute’s underlying purposes would be served by applying it to the situation at hand and
what effect this course of action would have on other widely accepted public values and constitutional norms.220 This approach
would allow the judiciary to exercise the equitable discretion
that is needed to avoid absurd results and other highly problematic outcomes that were not anticipated by the legislature
and to serve as a “cooperative partner” in the ongoing elaboration of the law when elected representatives have not explicitly
resolved a particular question.221 It would also facilitate deliberative accountability because courts will almost certainly
give reasoned explanations for these particular decisions and
elected representatives are always free to amend the law in response.
Finally, a better understanding of the concept of democratic accountability would call the continued legitimacy of the existing ballot initiative process into question, regardless of
whether a political accountability or deliberative accountability
paradigm is predominant. The initiative proponents who control the precise legal consequences of this process are neither
politically accountable to the voters nor expected to give reasoned explanations for their decisions. Nor do sufficient structural safeguards currently exist to entitle the final results of
this process to any special degree of respect.222 I have therefore
218. See Staszewski, supra note 91, at 1045 (distinguishing between
“known imprecision” and unanticipated problems that periodically arise in
statutory interpretation).
219. See Peter L. Strauss, The Courts and the Congress: Should Judges
Disdain Political History?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 242, 250–52 (1998) (recognizing
that the new textualism’s refusal to consult legislative history is in tension
with a constitutional structure that is designed to facilitate reasoned deliberation).
220. Cf. Staszewski, supra note 91, at 1047–55 (describing the general parameters of the absurdity doctrine in statutory interpretation).
221. See Eskridge, supra note 204, at 991 (“Academic debates about statutory interpretation methodology have increasingly involved competing ‘faithful
agent’ versus ‘cooperative partner’ understandings of the role of federal
judges.”).
222. See Eule, supra note 41, at 1503, 1549–55; Staszewski, supra note 38,
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previously advocated reforms that would help to clarify the
specific legal consequences of proposed ballot measures for the
voters and encourage the initiative proponents to engage in
reasoned deliberation during the lawmaking process.223 Specifically, the judiciary could adopt substantive canons of statutory
interpretation that would narrowly construe ambiguous ballot
measures in certain situations to avoid potentially manipulative behavior by initiative proponents and promote republican
principles of government.224 Moreover, the same basic structural safeguards that compel federal administrative agencies to
engage in reasoned decision making when they promulgate
regulations could be adopted in the initiative context.225 Both
proposals could improve the political accountability of the initiative process by enabling the voters to express their preferences more accurately.226 The application of an agency model
to direct democracy would also promote deliberative accountability in this context by requiring the initiative proponents to
consider competing perspectives and give reasoned explanations for their specific policy decisions that are subject to judicial review.227 In the meantime, it is important to dispel the notion that the existing ballot initiative process is “democracy in
at 398; supra Part IV.A (explaining the moderating role of structural safeguards on deliberative accountability).
223. See Staszewski, supra note 88, at 39–59.
224. See Frickey, supra note 87, at 517, 522 (advocating the establishment
of a strong preference for continuity in the ballot initiative context based on
republican principles of government, whereby “pre-existing law is displaced by
the ballot proposition only when the clear text or evident, core purposes of the
electorate so requires”); Schacter, supra note 39, at 156–61 (advocating the
narrow interpretation of ambiguous language when it seems especially likely
that a ballot measure was tainted by the manipulation of “highly organized,
concentrated, and well-funded interests”); Staszewski, supra note 88, at 45–55
(endorsing the foregoing proposals and claiming that courts should also “narrowly construe ambiguous ballot measures in accordance with the campaign
statements of their proponents”).
225. See Staszewski, supra note 38, at 447–59 (proposing the application of
an “agency model” to direct democracy and explaining what this reform would
entail).
226. See Staszewski, supra note 88, at 69–70.
227. Cf. Staszewski, supra note 38, at 459 (suggesting that such reforms
would “encourage meaningful deliberation and reasoned decisionmaking” as
well as “hold initiative proponents accountable for their actions during the
lawmaking process”). The substantive canons of statutory interpretation that
are endorsed above would also promote deliberative accountability by helping
to clarify the specific legal consequences of proposed ballot measures (thereby
potentially enabling reasoned deliberation about their merits) and leaving the
resolution of collateral policy issues to more deliberative lawmaking processes.
See Frickey, supra note 87, at 517–27; Staszewski, supra note 88, at 72.
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its purest form,”228 and to recognize instead that it is a highly
problematic form of lawmaking precisely because the relevant
decision-makers are not democratically accountable in any
meaningful way for their actions.
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN AMERICAN PUBLIC
LAW
Replacing the political accountability paradigm that currently dominates American public law with an enhanced focus
on deliberative accountability would also have tangible implications for certain individual rights in our democracy. Although
countless examples could be offered,229 this section focuses on
the debate over the legal status of same-sex marriage in the
United States. Aside from its status as one of the most hotly
contested issues of public policy, this particular example is illuminating for two reasons. First, the proper legal treatment of
same-sex marriage is relatively clear under the existing paradigm—namely, prohibition in accordance with the will of a majority. Second, an enhanced focus on deliberative accountability
leads to a different way of thinking about the issue and perhaps
different, or, at least more nuanced, conclusions.
This Article has explained that the political accountability
paradigm that dominates contemporary public law is generally
a fiction because most voters (1) are unaware of specific policy
issues; (2) do not have meaningful preferences regarding their
resolution; (3) are unaware of who is responsible for various
policy decisions; and (4) do not (and cannot) cast election ballots
on a sufficiently finely tuned, retrospective, issue-oriented basis.230 Same-sex marriage may, however, be the exception that
proves the rule: almost everyone is aware of this issue, and
many citizens have strong preferences on how it should be resolved, an ability to attribute some responsibility for relevant
decisions, and a propensity to vote partly on the basis of the
foregoing preferences and information.231 Unlike most other
228. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
229. See, e.g., GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at 230–345 (articulating deliberative conceptions of liberty, welfare, and fair opportunity); Cohen,
supra note 92, at 185, 201–21 (setting forth deliberative conceptions of religious, expressive, and moral liberty).
230. See supra Part II.
231. Even this concession may give too much credit to standard notions of
political accountability. In this regard, survey evidence of the salience of the
issue of same-sex marriage to voters is mixed. See Tonja Jacobi, How Massachusetts Got Gay Marriage: The Intersection of Popular Opinion, Legislative
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policy issues, the existing paradigm of public law could therefore be applied to the legal treatment of same-sex marriage in a
relatively meaningful and straight-forward fashion.
From a political-accountability perspective, the recent
wave of ballot initiatives that limit eligibility for marriage to
heterosexual couples represents a triumph of democracy.232
Moreover, it is entirely appropriate that legislatures throughout the country would enact similar restrictions.233 Nor is it
surprising that a President would advocate a constitutional
amendment that would prevent the judiciary and state governments from deviating from this norm.234 If it were not for
countermajoritarian features that make it extremely difficult to
amend the Federal Constitution, Congress and the people of
the states may very well have enacted this proposal.235 In any
event, again from this perspective, the federal judiciary would
Action, and Judicial Power, 15 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 219, 220–21, 223 &
n.21 (2006) (explaining that there was no political backlash against politicians
who supported the recognition of same-sex marriage in Massachusetts and
concluding from an evaluation of survey evidence from Gallup and Pew that
“[t]he salience of the same-sex marriage issue is subject to dispute, both in relation to the election, as discussed, and more generally”).
232. See, e.g., Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P. 3d 451, 465 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2003) (“[I]t is for the people of Arizona, through their elected representatives or by using the initiative process, rather than this court, to decide
whether to permit same-sex marriages.”); Maggie Gallagher, Aloha Chorus for
Gay Marriage Debate, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1997, at A15 (“Hawaii’s graceful,
commonsense solution [of amending the state constitution to allow the legislature to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples] represents both a rebuke to
power-hungry judges and an object lesson in how much better off we are when
difficult political issues are left to the political process.”); see also Thad Kousser & Mathew D. McCubbins, Social Choice, Crypto-Initiatives, and Policymaking By Direct Democracy, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 949, 971 (2005) (“In the November
2004 election, eleven states (Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Utah) considered
defense of marriage initiatives, and they all passed.”).
233. See Jacobi, supra note 231, at 222 (pointing out that twelve of the
thirteen states that recently enacted constitutional amendments to prohibit
same-sex marriage “already had both laws banning same-sex marriage and
state Defense of Marriage Acts, which prevented recognition of out of state
same-sex marriages”).
234. See Press Release, George W. Bush, President of the U. S., President
Calls for Constitutional Amendment Protecting Marriage (Feb. 24, 2004),
available at http://www.politicalvideo.org/george-bush-calls-constitutionalamendment-protecting-marriage.
235. See U.S. CONST. art. V. The Federal Marriage Amendment died in the
Senate when it failed to receive the two-thirds majority required in each
chamber of Congress to propose a constitutional amendment. See WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR. & DARREN R. SPEDALE, GAY MARRIAGE 39–41 (2006) (describing
the proceedings).
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plainly have no business interfering with the legitimate policy
choices of the people and their elected representatives to prohibit the legal recognition of same-sex marriage.236
The most striking aspect of this perspective is that the reasons for the majority’s policy choice and its resulting impact on
minorities make very little difference. Although the judiciary
could subject a legal prohibition on same-sex marriage to
heightened scrutiny on the grounds that it undermines a fundamental right or adversely affects a suspect class,237 this
course of action would epitomize the countermajoritarian difficulty. Because the political accountability paradigm posits that
lawmaking should reflect the will of the people and remain undiluted by the contrary personal preferences of politically unaccountable judges,238 legal prohibitions on same-sex marriage
should be adopted and upheld regardless of their substantive
merits.
An enhanced focus on deliberative accountability would
fundamentally reject this type of thoughtless deference to (potentially thoughtless) majoritarian preferences. The relevant
legal and policy question would become whether prohibitions on
same-sex marriage are justified by public-regarding reasons
that could reasonably be accepted by free and equal citizens
with competing perspectives. This question should, of course,
initially be resolved in the legislative process where prohibitions on same-sex marriage are initially considered. It would
therefore become necessary for lawmakers to evaluate the competing arguments regarding same-sex marriage that have been
offered by participants in this debate and to justify their positions with reasoned explanations.
The leading arguments against same-sex marriage have
evolved over time as the possibility of changing the traditional
status quo has been taken more seriously.239 The first generation of arguments relied on the traditional definition of marriage to reject the possibility of a legally sanctioned union be236. Cf. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 651–52 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s decision to invalidate a state constitutional
amendment that would prevent Colorado from taking any action to protect
gays and lesbians and claiming that “courts (as opposed to the political
branches)” have “no business” taking sides in a “culture war”).
237. See, e.g., Att’y Gen. of New York. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 906 n.6
(1986) (describing the conventional reasons for heightened judicial scrutiny).
238. See supra Part I.
239. See ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra note 235, at 20–31 (describing the
evolving opposition to same-sex marriage in the United States).
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tween two persons of the same sex.240 Because this argument is
obviously circular and therefore completely unpersuasive, opponents of same-sex marriage have proceeded to articulate
moral arguments against legal reform in this area. These arguments are typically rooted in sincerely held interpretations of
religious doctrine or based on an aversion toward homosexual
persons or their behavior.241 As such, they are not, standing
alone, public-regarding reasons for prohibiting same-sex marriage that could reasonably be accepted by free and equal citizens with competing perspectives.
Partly for this reason—and the related need to convince
relatively impartial courts and political moderates of the validity of their position—opponents of same-sex marriage have begun to place greater emphasis on the consequential arguments
that are allegedly in their favor.242 For example, they routinely
contend that the legal recognition of gay and lesbian unions
would be the first step down a slippery slope that would ultimately foreclose legal prohibitions on minors entering into
marriage, polygamy, incest, and even bestiality.243 Similarly,
they claim that the legal recognition of same-sex marriage
would destroy traditional marriage and thereby harm the increasing number of children who would grow up in singleparent families or with two cohabiting parents.244
If these claims were consistent with the available empirical
information and otherwise persuasive, they would count as
240. See id. at 21–22. For an example of a judicial decision that upheld the
validity of a legal prohibition of same-sex marriage solely on these grounds,
see Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589–90 (Ky. 1973).
241. See ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra note 235, at 23–24. For a leading
federal decision that relies upon traditional definitions and religious authority
to justify a refusal to recognize same-sex marriage, see Adams v. Howerton,
486 F. Supp. 1119, 1123 (C.D. Cal. 1980), aff ’d on other grounds, 673 F.2d
1036 (9th Cir. 1982).
242. See ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra note 235, at 25–30.
243. See id. at 24 (describing the “slippery slope” argument and observing
that it has “become almost boilerplate in speeches or books that oppose samesex marriage”).
244. For influential renditions of the “defense of marriage” argument
against same-sex marriage, see G. Sidney Buchanan, Same-Sex Marriage: The
Linchpin Issue, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 541, 565–72 (1985); Teresa Stanton Collett, Should Marriage Be Privileged?: The State’s Interest in Childbearing Unions, in MARRIAGE AND SAME-SEX UNIONS 152, 152–61 (Lynn D. Wardle et al.
eds., 2003); Maggie Gallagher, Normal Marriage: Two Views, in MARRIAGE
AND SAME-SEX UNIONS, supra, at 13, 13–24; see also ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE,
supra note 235, at 28–31 (describing the objection and explaining its contemporary popularity).
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public-regarding reasons for prohibiting same-sex marriage in
a deliberative democracy. Yet, the slippery-slope argument is
not supported by the experience of a single jurisdiction that has
legally recognized same-sex marriage or registered partnerships. An increasing number of foreign countries and a few
states have already recognized the legality of same-sex unions,
but there has not been any serious movement toward eliminating existing age of consent laws or prohibitions on polygamy,
incest, or bestiality in any of those jurisdictions.245 Moreover,
restrictions on the ability of minors to enter into marriage and
legal prohibitions of bestiality and some forms of incest are distinguishable from the legal recognition of same-sex marriage
and registered partnerships based on the existence vel non of
valid consent.246 Finally, while same-sex marriage and registered partnerships recognize a mutual commitment between
the participants, polygamy necessarily places one member of
the relationship on a different and evidently superior footing
and is therefore arguably distinguishable on this basis.247
The “defense of marriage” argument is based on the underlying premise that “the great virtue of marriage is the creation
of an altruistic space, where adults sacrifice their own selfinterest in the service of mutual commitment to one another
and to children they raise together.”248 The proponents of this
argument maintain that traditional marriage has declined because this ideal has been sacrificed by liberalizations that treat
marriage as just another avenue for seeking self-fulfillment
and pleasure.249 The legal recognition of same-sex marriage
would allegedly render the liberal conception of marriage victorious and constitute the proverbial straw that broke traditional
245. See ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra note 235, at 36, 169–72.
246. Cf. Brett H. McDonnell, Is Incest Next?, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J.
337, 337 & n.2 (2004) (evaluating how Lawrence v. Texas affects laws regulating other forms of sexual behavior, including consensual adult incest, but expressly excluding “behavior that is not consensual or where one or more of the
persons involved is not adult” from this inquiry); see also ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra note 235, at 24 (distinguishing prohibitions on same-sex marriage
from age of consent laws on the grounds that “[m]inors are not mature enough
to consent”).
247. See Shayna M. Sigman, Everything Lawyers Know About Polygamy Is
Wrong, 16 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 101, 169 (2006) (“[I]nternational law
has deemed polygamy an offense against equality.”); see also ESKRIDGE &
SPEDALE, supra note 235, at 24 (distinguishing legal prohibitions on same-sex
marriage from prohibitions of polygamy on the grounds that “polygamy is a
terrible legal regime from women’s point of view”).
248. ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra note 235, at 29.
249. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
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marriage’s back.250 The demise of traditional marriage would,
in turn, lead to more children being born and raised out of wedlock, thereby causing irreparable harm to society’s most vulnerable political minority.251
This argument is analytically flawed because same-sex
couples can, and do enter into relationships that comport with
the traditional ideal of marriage. Although such couples cannot
give birth to their own biological children, they could raise the
biological children of one parent and other children obtained
through adoption.252 And, obviously, heterosexual couples (as
well as same-sex couples) are sometimes unwilling or unable to
raise children; parenting is not a mandatory requirement of
marriage.253 Moreover, the link between the liberal demise of
traditional marriage and the legal recognition of same-sex marriage is a non sequitur.254 The traditional family has declined
primarily because of legal reforms that were designed to protect
cohabitation and make it easier for heterosexual couples to obtain divorces. Expanding the group of citizens who are eligible
to enter into marriage would neither facilitate cohabitation nor
make it easier to dissolve existing marriages. On the contrary,
the legal recognition of same-sex marriage or registered part250. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 15 (1996), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2919–21 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT].
251. See, e.g., id. at 2913, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2917 (“At
bottom, civil society has an interest in maintaining and protecting the institution of heterosexual marriage because it has a deep and abiding interest in encouraging responsible procreation and child-rearing.”); Gallagher, supra note
244, at 19 (claiming that “same-sex marriage puts at risk” the basic ideal that
“marriage is about . . . the reproduction of children and society” and “the presumption that children need mothers and fathers, and that marriage is the
way in which we do our best to get them for children”); see also ESKRIDGE &
SPEDALE, supra note 235, at 30 (pointing out that the defense of marriage argument draws some of its broad appeal from the underlying notion that “[t]he
most vulnerable minority is the children, and if there is the slightest risk that
homosexual marriage would hurt the children, that should suffice”).
252. See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 881–82 (Vt. 1999) (canvassing data
on the increasing number of children who are being raised by same-sex parents through assisted-reproductive techniques and adoption).
253. See id. (concluding that the state’s asserted interest in “furthering the
link between procreation and child rearing” was insufficient to justify denial of
the legal benefits of marriage to same-sex couples because this statutory exclusion was significantly over- and under-inclusive); HOUSE REPORT, supra
note 250, at 2914, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2918 (“[S]ociety has made
the eminently sensible judgment to permit heterosexuals to marry, notwithstanding the fact that some couples cannot or simply choose not to have children.”).
254. See ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra note 235, at 180–89 (articulating a
more fully developed version of this argument).
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nerships would presumably increase the number of “married”
couples, as well as the number of children who are raised by
two parents who are married to one another.
Not surprisingly, the defense of marriage argument is also
questionable as an empirical matter. Proponents of the argument have claimed that the legal recognition of registered
partnerships in Scandinavia has caused a decline in marriage
and an increase in the number of children born and raised out
of wedlock in those countries.255 William Eskridge and Darren
Spedale have recently maintained, however, that this claim is
unsupported by a close examination of the data.256 Rather, Eskridge and Spedale claim that the data fully supports the analysis in the preceding paragraph.257 In any event, there is no reputable empirical evidence that children raised by two parents
of the same sex are worse off than children raised by two parents of the opposite sex.258 Indeed, while there is reliable statistical evidence that being raised by a single parent is not in the
best interest of children,259 the benefits of having two parents
appear to accrue to the children regardless of whether their
parents are married.260 Accordingly, while the research is un255. See Stanley Kurtz, The End of Marriage in Scandinavia, WKLY.
STANDARD, Feb. 2, 2004; Stanley Kurtz, Slipping Toward Scandinavia, NAT’L
REV. ONLINE,
Feb.
2,
2004,
http://www.nationalreview.com/kurtz/
kurtz200402020917.asp.
256. See ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra note 235, at 169–202.
257. See id. at 131–67, 173–79.
258. See Carlos A. Ball & Janice Farrell Pea, Warring with Wardle: Morality, Social Science, and Gay and Lesbian Parents, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 253, 278
(claiming that the social science literature does not support the view that
children raised by gays and lesbians are harmed by the sexual orientation of
their parents); Judith Stacey & Timothy J. Biblarz, (How) Does the Sexual
Orientation of Parents Matter?, 66 AM. SOC. REV. 159, 160 (2001) (identifying
certain limitations in the existing literature, but reporting that most research
in psychology “reports findings of no notable differences between children
reared by heterosexual parents and those reared by lesbian and gay parents,
and that it finds lesbigay parents to be as competent and effective as heterosexual parents”).
259. See generally SARA MCLANAHAN & GARY SANDEFUR, GROWING UP
WITH A SINGLE PARENT (1994) (compiling statistical data that demonstrates
that children who grow up with only one parent in the household have a harder time making the transition from adolescence to adulthood); JUDITH WALLERSTEIN ET AL., THE UNEXPECTED LEGACY OF DIVORCE (2000); Sharon K.
Houseknecht & Jaya Sastry, Family “Decline” and Child Well-Being: A Comparative Assessment, 58 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 726 (1996) (comparing varying
degrees of family decline in the United States, Sweden, Switzerland, and New
Zealand).
260. See, e.g., GUNILLA RINGBÄCK WEITOFT, LONE PARENTING, SOCIOECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND SEVERE ILL-HEALTH (2003) (finding that children
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doubtedly in a preliminary state, the defense of marriage argument against same-sex marriage appears at this time to
amount to nothing more than unwarranted speculation.
Based on the foregoing analysis, there does not appear to
be any valid reason for prohibiting same-sex marriage that
could reasonably be accepted by free and equal citizens with
competing perspectives. In other words, if gay and lesbian
couples want to create “an altruistic space, where adults sacrifice their own self-interest in the service of mutual commitment
to one another and to children they raise together,”261 why
shouldn’t a republican democracy let them? This conclusion
holds, moreover, without even considering the unusually strong
interests of gay and lesbian couples who would like to enter into legally valid marriages. First, such couples seek access to a
legal right that the Supreme Court has already declared fundamental in our society.262 Second, they seek to be treated the
same as heterosexual couples who can freely enter into marriage.263 Third, they seek access to the multitude of rights, benefits, and obligations that result from entering into a legally valid marriage.264 Lawmakers in a democracy should ordinarily
pause before adopting any policy that denies a single group liberty, equality, and material benefits, but such action should
be a non-starter when no valid considerations appear on the
other side of the ledger.
Eskridge and Spedale have recognized, however, that the
true reason for widespread opposition to the legal recognition of
same-sex marriage may stem from what they refer to as “the
politics of disgust.”265 In other words, regardless of what they
raised by two cohabiting or married parents, including parents who live with a
partner who is unrelated to the child, are better off along a variety of important measures than children raised by “lone parents”). There is a potential
concern, however, that cohabiting parents are more likely to split up, resulting
in a lone-parent family. The legal recognition of same-sex marriage would, of
course, have a tendency to alleviate this concern, in addition to increasing the
number of children who are raised in a household with two parents. See ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra note 235, at 197–99 (explaining that Weitoft’s
study, which is heavily relied upon by some opponents of same-sex marriage,
can be utilized to support its legal recognition).
261. See ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra note 235, at 29.
262. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
263. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra note 235, at 13.
264. For a recent compilation of those rights and obligations under federal
law, see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-353R, DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04353r.pdf.
(identifying 1138 federal laws in which marital status is a factor).
265. See ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra note 235, at 220–28 (explaining that
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say, many people vehemently oppose same-sex marriage because they find homosexual people or their behavior repulsive.
Although this “disgust” is certainly not a public-regarding reason for prohibiting same-sex marriage that could reasonably be
accepted by free and equal citizens with a competing perspective, there is a less pejorative way of describing the underlying
concern. Specifically, the concern appears to be that the legal
recognition of same-sex marriage would eliminate a deeply felt
need for “boundaries” that is an essential aspect of the selfdefinition of certain individuals.266 Simply put, for some people,
the legal recognition of same-sex marriage would “rock their
world” in a particularly upsetting way.
On one hand, this more neutral-sounding explanation for
opposition to same-sex marriage may be a fancy way of trying
to justify rank prejudice or the imposition of some people’s religious beliefs upon others.267 On the other hand, it also illustrates the potential importance of respecting the spiritual beliefs and cultural norms of different citizens to the extent
reasonably possible in the formation of public policy.268 In this
regard, Eskridge and Spedale draw an analogy between this
opposition toward same-sex marriage and the likely attitude of
Native Americans who have their sacred land condemned by
the government for public purposes.269 The implication is that
spiritual beliefs and cultural norms of this nature are real, legitimate, and entitled to a reasonable degree of respect from citizens with fundamentally different perspectives.
This discussion highlights the occasional difficulty of clearly defining a public-regarding reason that could reasonably be
accepted by free and equal citizens with competing perspectives. It also marks a specific debate that participants in the
controversy over the legality of same-sex marriage should be
“a politics of disgust is one that is driven by . . . emotional responses,” rather
than “rational analyses and argumentation”).
266. See id. at 223–25; see also MARY DOUGLAS, PURITY AND DANGER
(1966) (recognizing the role of boundary maintenance that is served by disgust).
267. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Body Politics: Lawrence v. Texas and the
Constitution of Disgust and Contagion, 57 FLA. L. REV. 1011, 1048 (2005)
(“[D]isgust-based regulatory schemes tend to sacrifice the liberties of the minority in pursuit of goals that are often not linked to the common good.”).
268. Cf. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at 84–85 (advocating an
“economy of moral disagreement” in which “citizens should seek the rationale
that minimizes rejection of the position they oppose” when “justifying policies
on moral grounds”).
269. See ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra note 235, at 224–25.
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having.270 This debate need not be definitely resolved at this
time, however, because there is an available compromise that
could generate deliberative agreement on an appropriate solution. In particular, registered partnerships or civil unions
would provide gay and lesbian couples with most of the legal
rights, benefits, and obligations of traditional marriage. Moreover, the availability of this legal status would go a long way toward equalizing the treatment that is provided to couples with
different sexual orientations in our society and extending the
fundamental right to “marry.” Meanwhile, it would preserve a
meaningful boundary that is important to some people for sincerely held moral or cultural reasons, and provide a basis for
further empirical study. While these particular solutions might
not give all the people (or any person) precisely what they
want, that is quite often the nature of a principled, deliberative
compromise.
One might object that a theory that emphasizes reasoned
deliberation about the merits of policy choices should not resort
to pragmatic solutions that avoid difficult substantive questions. Such an objection misunderstands the position in the
same-sex marriage debate that is indefensible. Although there
is no valid reason for declining to extend a meaningful form of
legal recognition to same-sex couples, there are a variety of valid perspectives regarding the most appropriate solution. Indeed, the gay rights community is split over whether “marriage” itself is the most appropriate solution or whether the
creation of a new legal partnership arrangement that is free
from the historical “baggage” of traditional marriage would be
preferable.271 Moreover, a majority of the general public would
apparently prefer to recognize the legality of civil unions at
least partly for the reasons described above.272 A wellfunctioning deliberative process would therefore simultaneously reject indefensible policy choices (e.g., the anti-recognition
position) and choose from among the remaining options by
reaching the best available accommodation of competing views
270. The proper role of “disgust” or boundary maintenance in the law is the
subject of an incipient literature. See Courtney Megan Cahill, Same-Sex Marriage, Slippery Slope Rhetoric, and the Politics of Disgust: A Critical Perspective on Contemporary Family Discourse and the Incest Taboo, 99 NW. U. L.
REV. 1543 (2005).
271. See ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra note 235, at 17–18.
272. See AM. ENTER. INST. IN PUB. OPINION, ATTITUDES ABOUT HOMOSEXUALITY & GAY MARRIAGE 27–28 (2004) (reporting survey results that consistently favor civil unions over legal recognition of same-sex marriage).
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and interests under the circumstances—which could ultimately
reflect the majority’s apparent preferences.
Thus far, this section has concluded that a well-functioning
deliberative lawmaking process would lead to the adoption of
registered partnerships or civil unions for same-sex couples at
this time. Nonetheless, with a few exceptions, this is not what
has occurred to date in the United States.273 Instead, most
states have enacted ballot initiatives or other laws that preclude the legal recognition of same-sex marriage and appear to
foreclose the creation of registered partnerships or civil unions
as well.274 What is the appropriate role of the judiciary when
reasoned deliberation on an important policy issue has so evidently failed within democratic lawmaking institutions?
This is, of course, a very hard question that lies at the crux
of public law in a democracy. My view is that it would not be illegitimate for courts to invalidate legal prohibitions of same-sex
marriage on constitutional grounds in light of the preceding
analysis. This is particularly true when those laws were
enacted pursuant to ballot initiatives, where the deliberative
shortcomings of the lawmaking process are so readily apparent.275 On the other hand, judicial decisions of this nature need
not require state officials to recognize the legality of same-sex
273. See Peter Hay, Recognition of Same-Sex Legal Relationships in the
United States, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 257, 257 (2006) (“So far, only Massachusetts
permits same-sex marriage, Vermont and Connecticut provide for ‘civil unions,’ some states provide for registered domestic partnerships, and a number
of other states extend benefits to domestic partners, without however giving
that partnership a particular legal status.”). The Supreme Court of California
recently held that its state Constitution guarantees the basic civil right of
marriage “to all individuals and couples, without regard to their sexual orientation.” In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 427 (Cal. 2008) (emphasis added);
see also Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A. 2d 407, 418 (Conn. 2008)
(holding that state laws that restricted civil marriage to heterosexual couples
violated the equal protection rights of same-sex couples under the state constitution). The California decision was recently overruled by the enactment of
Proposition 8 pursuant to the ballot initiative process. See Gay Rights Hit
Hard at Polls, NEWSDAY, Nov. 6, 2008, at w17.
274. See supra notes 232–33 and accompanying text; see also Hay, supra
note 273, at 276 (“[S]tate law in some forty states, by statute, constitutional
provision, or judicial interpretation of existing marriage laws forbids same-sex
marriage or civil union and denies recognition to such relationships formalized
elsewhere.”).
275. For arguments that the validity of ballot initiatives of this nature
should be reviewed more stringently than ordinary legislation by the courts in
circumstances of this nature, see Eule, supra note 41, at 1558–59; and Hans A.
Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking Is Not “Republican Government”: The
Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REV. 19, 21 (1993).
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marriage. Rather, the court could invalidate legal prohibitions
on same-sex marriage or restrictions on the benefits and obligations of marriage to opposite-sex couples, and “remand” the
matter to the legislature for additional deliberation on the appropriate remedy.276 This approach, which was followed in
Vermont,277 would simultaneously reverse the “burden of inertia” that makes it difficult to enact new legislation that dramatically changes the status quo (even when it is supported by a
majority—as may be the case for civil unions),278 facilitate reasoned deliberation among interested citizens and lawmakers
regarding the best available solution, and perhaps lead to the
legal recognition of civil unions instead of same-sex marriage.279 As explained above, this is the solution that should
probably have emerged from a well-functioning deliberative
lawmaking process in the first place.
Indeed, the same-sex marriage controversy illustrates one
of the greatest benefits of judicial review from the standpoint of
deliberative accountability. If everyone knows that the preferences of a majority will ultimately prevail regardless of the validity of the underlying reasons for a policy decision, some participants in the lawmaking process would have little incentive
to engage in reasoned deliberation with their opponents on particularly divisive issues.280 If, however, everyone knows that
the validity of the resulting decision will be subject to a form of
judicial review that evaluates the strength of the underlying
reasons for a decision, proponents of competing positions will
have incentives to set forth public-regarding reasons for their
views as persuasively as possible.281 When no persuasive rea276. See ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra note 235, at 238–39 (advocating an
incremental approach to the legal recognition of same-sex marriage, but endorsing the approach taken by the Vermont Supreme Court).
277. See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 886–88 (Vt. 1999).
278. See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
279. Cf. Jacobi, supra note 231, at 239 (claiming that by remanding its decision to invalidate the state’s legal prohibition of same-sex marriage to the
legislature, the Massachusetts Supreme Court was able to give lawmakers an
incentive to provide legal recognition to civil unions and reduce public opposition to same-sex marriage).
280. See John Ferejohn, Instituting Deliberative Democracy, in DESIGNING
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS 75, 94 (Ian Shapiro & Stephen Macedo eds., 2000)
(“[D]eliberation takes place against a background of common understandings
about what will occur following the formation of, or the failure to form, a deliberative consensus.”).
281. Hard-look judicial review of agency decisions can be understood in a
similar fashion. Cf. Seidenfeld, supra note 95, at 1541–50 (explaining that
from a civic republican perspective, judicial review of administrative action
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sons for a given policy choice exist, it should be invalidated by a
court that gives a reasoned explanation for its decision. This
practice promotes deliberative accountability at several stages
of the American public law system.
CONCLUSION
In addition to demonstrating some of the tangible implications of a shift in the prevailing paradigm of democratic accountability, the same-sex marriage controversy illustrates a
broader point about the way in which claims about political accountability are regularly employed in modern public law. In
particular, the idea that policy decisions are legitimated solely
by virtue of the fact that they were enacted pursuant to direct
democracy or by elected representatives and therefore presumably reflect the majority’s will typically plays a rhetorical function that avoids (and may be designed to avoid) the need to justify the underlying policy on the merits. If legal prohibitions on
same-sex marriage are indefensible on the merits, the best
available strategy for defending this policy may be to change
the subject to the widely recognized need to respect the will of
the people by deferring to the choices of politically accountable
officials. Even when a policy choice is debatable, the advocates
of the prevailing policy may prefer to rest their case on the
need to defer to the legitimate choices of a majority, rather
than engage with their opponents in a mutually respectful discussion of the substantive merits of an issue. In short, advocates of the political accountability paradigm may invoke this
rhetoric as a strategic substitute for defending the merits of a
policy decision, which they undoubtedly favor on other
grounds.282 The irony is that while reason-giving is often criticized as a mechanism of accountability because participants in
the lawmaking process may not give candid reasons for their
positions, arguments for political accountability are often pretext for what is truly motivating a discretionary policy choice.
Nonetheless, pretextual arguments can often be debunked
through a process of reasoned deliberation. In this spirit, this
“would become a meaningful dialogue between court and agency in which the
court stands in for the knowledgeable citizen that the agency must persuade to
accept the regulatory policy”); supra note 166 and accompanying text.
282. Cf. Friedman, Academic Obsession, supra note 21, at 156–57 (claiming
that “the countermajoritarian difficulty that obsesses the legal academy is not
some timeless problem grounded in immutable truths” but rather “it
represents—as it almost always has—a need to justify present-day political
preferences in light of an inherited intellectual tradition”).
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Article has explained that elected officials are not politically accountable for their specific policy decisions in the manner that
is typically envisioned by contemporary public law theory.
Moreover, it has claimed that public officials in a democracy
can be held deliberatively accountable for their decisions and
developed an alternative paradigm. Finally, it has argued that
the deliberative accountability paradigm should be made paramount in American public law and explained some of the
theoretical and doctrinal implications of doing so. Most notably,
discretionary policy decisions in a democracy would need to be
defended on the merits, rather than by relying upon rhetoric
about the need to defer to the decisions of officials who are “politically accountable”—which, as we have seen, is mostly false.

